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IMPASSES IN JUSTICE
ARTHUR T. VANDERBILTt
The Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lectureship was established in the
School of Law of Washington University by alumni of the school in 1949,
to honor the memory of a well-loved alunmus and faculty member whose
connection with and service to the school extended over the period 1898-
1947. This eighth annual lecture was delivered on April 24, 1956.
The temptation in addressing lawyers or law students is always to
stress the grand achievements of the bench and bar over the centuries
in building up law and order and at the same time promoting individ-
ual liberty and to ignore the obvious embarrassing shortcomings of the
present, for which we are all collectively responsible. It takes some
courage for me to face the facts of the particular problems I wish to
discuss with you, for I have spent my working life with lawyers and
judges, with law professors and law students-and I like them and I
appreciate what they have done for civilization. I am emboldened to
speak up, however, by the consciousness that what I have to say is
based not on mere book learning, but rather on many years of varied
experience-an experience of thirty-four years in the trial of cases
and the argument of appeals in one state, an equal number of years of
law teaching in another state with quite a different legal background,
ten seemingly futile years as chairman of a judicial council working
for court reorganization against the opposition or indifference of most
of the judges and without any aid from the bar associations, seven
years in a citizens' movement helping to achieve a new state constitu-
tion, and eight years as chief justice and as the administrative head of
a new court system, struggling to overcome the ingrained defects of
the old order without any changes in judicial personnel except by rea-
son of incapacity or death or through the normal course of retirement
at seventy. It would be much more pleasant to address you on some
t Chief Justice, Supreme Court of New Jersey.
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such subject as how to try a case or how to argue an appeal, but believ-
ing as I do that the most important problem confronting every branch
of the legal profession-the bench, the bar, and the law schools alike
-is the failure of the law and the administration of justice to keep
pace with the needs of the times, I should not be serving either the
bench or the bar, the lawyers of tomorrow or the public generally, if I
failed to deal with the situation as I find it.
Although a considerable part of our substantive law is far from
*what it should be, popular discontent with the law centers around the
techniques by which justice is administered-the organization of our
courts and how they manage their business. It is in the courts, and
not at the hands of the chief executive or the legislature, that men and
women in actual life feel the keen, cutting edge of the law. They
therefore judge the law by what they see and hear in courts and by
the character and manners of judges and lawyers quite as much as by
the law itself. Viewed in this light, what seems at first blush to be a
mere matter of procedural machinery suddenly is revealed as of prime
importance to the public. It is this very matter of machinery-the
anachronisms, the technicalities, the absurdities and unfairness of pro-
cedure, and the inexcusable delays in disposing of controversies on
the merits-along with occasional defects of judicial temperament or
character-that has been creating in many places disrespect for law
at a time when everyone should be continually conscious of the funda-
mental principle that it is the law alone and its adequate enforcement
that make individual liberty possible. Yet, oblivious to all this, the
bench and bar in too many places have neglected to further the neces-
sary reforms for the improvement of the techniques by which justice
is administered.
Fortunately the remedies for these procedural and administrative
defects are relatively simple, at least when compared with many com-
plicated problems of substantive law or with the intricacies of the or-
ganization, personnel, and procedure of the executive branch of gov-
ernment, especially at the national level. Moreover, the remedies for
our judicial ills are well known and generally agreed on by those who
have taken pains to study the situation objectively. No lengthy pro-
gram of research or of experimentation is required; all we have to do
is to recognize the seriousness of the situation, overcome our profes-
sional lethargy, and apply the remedies that study and experience
have demonstrated to be effective, if we would satisfy the popular com-
plaints as to the law's delays, the decision of cases on technicalities of
procedure or by the use of surprise and would meet the just demands
of the people for honest and competent judges and jurors. Unlike
many of the differences concerning various problems of substantive
law, there really cannot be any honest difference of opinion about the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss3/1
IMPASSES IN JUSTICE
high desirability of an effective system of judicial administration or
the means by which it is to be achieved. These are self-evident; im-
plementation is all that is necessary.
Before considering the deficiencies of the courts in some detail we
should first seek the causes that produced them. Just fifty years ago,
in 1906, Dean Roscoe Pound, then a young man of thirty-six, delivered
before the American Bar Association at St. Paul a memorable address
entitled "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administra-
tion of Justice."', Dean Wigmore later referred to it as "the spark
that kindled the white flame of progress.' 2 More than once have I said
if I had my way I would make it prescribed reading once a year for
every judge, practicing lawyer, law professor, and law student on the
day he returns from his summer vacation and starts a new year of
professional activity. Unfortunately all too much of what Dean Pound
criticized fifty years ago still exists today. He noted in his address
that American reform in procedure had stopped substantially where
the New York Code Commission left off in 1848, and we have to add
here that no advances worth recording occurred in this field from then
on until the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
1938-ninety years later. Happily, however, much has been achieved
since then, especially in the federal field, and there has been progress
in some states, while in others there is encouraging ferment.3 But the
crucial question remains: Why with such obvious needs has there been
so little progress in nearly a century?
It is not oversimplifying our problem too much to say that at the
bottom of all our difficulties in court reform lie: (1) the equalitarian
and antiprofessional movement of the Jacksonian Era in the second
quarter of the nineteenth century, and (2) (this I fear will shock
many) the failure of our law schools generally to recognize as their
most important responsibility to society the improvement of the ad-
ministration of justice.
With the election of Andrew Jackson as President in 1829 the spirit
of the frontier took over control of the country, especially in the field
of government and law. Jefferson had declared in 1776 that "all men
are created equal," but by Jackson's time it was bravely asserted by
the plain people that all men are in fac equal, and despite the obvious
lack of reality of the new thought, they proceeded to carry it to its
logical conclusion in public life. First to go were the restrictions on
suffrage and officeholding that had operated to exaggerate inequalities
1. 21o A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906).
2. Wigrnore, Roscoe Pound's St. Pa d Address of 1906, 20 J. AAi. JuD. Soc'Y 176
(1937).
3. See I BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 9 (1950,
Supp. !956).
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in a society that had proclaimed the equality of all men.4 But the
equalitarian spirit of the times demanded more. New state constitu-
tions were popular, since through them the people extended their con-
trol of government;5 the power of the legislature to act freely was
limited in various respects, and the number of popularly elected of-
ficials, judges included, was increased with a view to decreasing legis-
lative and executive patronage.7
In this period, unfortunately, the leaders of the legal profession,
able in the law as many were, not only failed to recognize the needs of
the times, but by refusing to pay heed to valid popular criticism of the
courts8 invited popular interference with the administration of justice.
4. Property qualifications for suffrage existed in all the thirteen original
states. In 1800 only in Kentucky, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Vermont
was male suffrage comparatively unlimited. As the new western states entered
the Union without suffrage restrictions the movement for extension of the suffrage
gathered momentum in the older states. Restrictions were gradually lifted and
by 1830 most of the old religious and property barriers to manhood suffrage had
been eliminated. See generally PORTER, HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED
STATES 1-102 (1918).
5. See BowERs, THE PARTY BATTLES OF THE JACKSONIAN PERIOD 65-70 (1922);
WHITE, THE JACKSONIAN, A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 1829-1861, at 11
(1954).
6. See SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF JACKSON 51 (1945); TURNER, THE UNITED
STATES 1830-1850, at 128 (1935). In particular, the power of state legislatures to
contract debts was curtailed. Rezneck, Social History of an American Depression,
1837-1843, 40 AM. HIST. REV. 662, 681 (1935).
7. Belief in the "virtue, intelligence and full capacity for self-government, of
the great mass of our people" expressed in 1 DEM. REV. 2 (1837), led to the ex-
tension of the reach of the elective process. See The Elective Franchise, 22
DEM. REV. (n.s.) 97 (1848), in which the advantages of elective over appointed
officials were developed. The great examples of the change-over from appointed
to elected officials were New York and Pennsylvania. In 1820 the Council of
Appointment in New York controlled 14,950 officers. The majority of these
which were local were made elective in the 1820's. FISH, CIVIL SERVICE AND
PATRONAGE 90-91 (1905). The 1846 Constitution which included provisions for
an elected judiciary was approved of in the Dewcratic Review because of further
reduction and decentralization of patronage. 19 DEM. REV. (n.s.) 339, 341
(1846). In Pennsylvania the transformation of a large number of offices from
appointive to elective occurred at the constitutional convention of 1837-38.
HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT: PENNSYLVANIA, 1776-1860,
at 22-23, 29 (1948). Provisions for the election of judges were not adopted, how-
ever, until 1850. HAYNES, SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 127 (1944).
8. The delays and costliness of legal proceedings, those proverbial evils with
which lawyers and judges had failed to deal adequately, were one cause of popular
discontent. See 4 LEwIs, GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 312, 351-52 (1909) ; LUDLUI,
SOCIAL FERMENT IN VERIONT 1791-1850, at 203-04 (1939); Norton, Judicial Re-form in Michigan, 51 MICH. L. REV. 203, 232-33 (1952). For examples of con-
temporary comment, see 18 DEM. REV. (n.s.) 403, 413 (1848); REPORT OF THE
DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 1846, at 482, 574 (Bishop & Attree eds.
1846); MICHIGAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS OF 1835-36, at 282 (Dorr ed.
1940).
The standards of the bar and bench were not always high, nor adhered to;
this and the difficulties of removing unsatisfactory judges contributed to dissatis-
faction with the courts. See 1 STRONG, DIARY 106 n.3 (Nevins & Thomas eds.
1952). For excellent discussion of the frontier bench and bar and popular prej-
udices against common-law procedure and lawyers as debt collectors, see ENGLISH,
THE PIONEER LAWYER AND JURIST IN MISSOURI (21 U. of Mo. Studies No. 2, 1947),
especially at 11-13, 65-73, 87-89, 95-96. As to outrageous conduct of a drunken
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Genuine dissatisfaction with the courts combined with the Jacksonian
democratic doctrines of popular control of government to bring about:
(1) changes in the manner of selection and the tenure of the judiciary;
(2) restrictions on the power of the trial judge to conduct a trial; (3)
the lowering of standards for the legal profession; (4) the increase in
the functions of the jury; and (5) legislative attempts to codify and
simplify procedure-all of which obstructed the administration of
justice and resulted in genuine injury to the public which the courts
are designed to serve.
At this time, except in the federal courts and a few of the original
thirteen states,0 judges appointed during good behavior in accordance
with the common-law tradition were superseded by judges elected by
the people-in reaction against the abuses that had developed through
political maneuvers in the selection of judges whether by the legisla-
ture or the governor.-0 These elections were generally for short
terms" in compliance with the new political principle of rotation in
office that the doctrine of equality called forth, although the underly-
ing motive was more frankly disclosed in the slogan: "To the victor
belong the spoils."'! The popular philosophy of the Jacksonian Era was
marked by a rejection of educated and professional people and an em-
phasis on the capacity of the innate genius of the self-made man to
solve all problems. 3 In almost every state, as the result of dissatisfac-
udge on the bench as contributing to the change to an elected judiciary, see
OOTE, BENCH AND BAR OF THE SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST 21 (1876).
The use of English procedural forms to defeat an action without a decision
on the merits early had led to some statutory reforms which were often diverted
from their purpose by courts anxious to adhere to traditional professional
technicalities, with which the public had lost patience. As to the formalism of
some early judges, see ENGLISH, o1. cit. sz~pra, at 86. For scathing criticism of
the nicetie-s of New York practice, see review of Howard's Special Term Reports,
in 19 DEN. REV. (n.s.) 19 (1846).
9. HAYNES, op. cit. supra note 7, at 89-90, 97-100. For a tabular history of all
the states in this regard, see id. at 101-35.
0, Id. at 80-136. See also Aum.NN, CHANGING AmRIcAN LEGAL SYSTEM1
185-89 (1940). For examples of contemporary criticisms of politics in the selec-
tioun of judges, see Bishop & Attree eds., op. cit. supra note 8, at 141-42, 410,
582-85, 787-93; 1 REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION
FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO 1850-51. at 86
(Smith ed. 1851); 2 id. at 355.
11, CARPENTER, JUDICIAL TENURE IN THE UNITED STATES 171-84 (1918).
12. As to the adoption of the principle of rotation in office, see WHITE, op. Cit.
supra note 5, at vii, 4-5, 300-01, 315-18, 325-31. For an explanation of the origins
of this practice and of the spoils system, see FISH, op. Cit. supra note 7, at 79-83,
90-104.
13. Among the Jacksonians "the reason of the university was rejected in behalf
of the higher reason of nature." WARD, ANDREw JACKSON, SYMBOL FOR AN AGE
50 (1955). Ward contrasts this with the Jeffersonian emphasis on education and
ascribes Jackson's 1828 victory to popular rejection of the trained intellect. Id.
at 64-71, 167-78, 210, 213. An interesting example of the belief in the efficacy of
native intelligence and its virtues as contrasted with the educated mind is to be
found in a letter of George Washington Strong, the conservative successful New
York lawyer. Writing, Dec. 31, 1827, contrasting Kent and Story with Parsons
and Marshall, he remarked the former were great for their legal knowledge
Washington University Open Scholarship
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tion with the bar and the general antiprofessional spirit of the era,
standards for admission to the bar were lowered and in four states
professional requirements were practically abolished. 14 At the same
time, as part of the historical pattern of reliance on the jury as repre-
sentative of the people, the jury's powers were extended and the com-
mon-law powers of a judge presiding at a trial were stipped from him
by legislation reducing him to the position of a mere moderator. 15 In
most of the states the judge was forbidden to ask questions of a wit-
ness, even though it was necessary to bring out the truth. He was not
allowed to summarize the evidence to the jury, or to comment on it to
make it understandable to the laymen who made up the jury, or even
to charge the jury as to the law in his own language. 6 Instead he was
required in most states-and still is-to compose his charge from the
requests for instructions made by one or the other of the opposing
counsel. This charge he was required to read to the jury, before the
barrage and counterbarrage of the summations by the respective coun-
sel. Inevitably the law of the case as thus given to the jury by the
judge was lost in the flood of partisan advocacy that followed it. As
a result, trial by jury became a popular show rather than an orderly
search for the facts in the interest of justice.17
but that the latter were great in another sense-they relied not so much on
books as on the capacity of their minds: "Greatness in this latter sense is esteemed
greater than in the former." 1 STRONG, DIRy xv (Nevins & Thomas eds. 1952).
14. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 85-90 (1921).
By 1840 only one-third of the states required a definite period of preparation for
admission to the bar. The 1851 Indiana constitutional provision extending the
right to practice to all voters of good character was later explained: "The prac-
tice of law was regarded as a participation not only in the administration ofjustice, but in the administration of government itself, and why should the intelli-
gent pioneer not have the right to defend his neighbor, in a criminal or civil case,
when the professional lawyer was as scarce in the newly-settled communities as
he was then?" Reinhard, The Right to Practice Law, 1902 IND. BAR Ass'N REP.
129. For contemporary testimony of the ease of admission to the bar, see
BALDWIN, THE FLUSH TImEs OF AI BA3MA AND Mississippi 51, 132 (1853); 1
STRONG, op. cit. supra note 13, at 164-65. 241.
15. See Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARv. L. REv. 582, 584(1939), discussing
the judiciary's response to a specific demand of democratic theory-the de-
mand that the jury in criminal cases should not only determine the facts butjudge the law as well.... The conflict between democratic hopes and English
common-law traditions, between a frontier concept of popular justice and an
old-world fact of King's law, was sharply mirrored in the issue as to what
limits were to be set to the jury's rights.
It was not until 1895 that it was conclusively decided in the federal courts that thejury was bound to follow the judge's instructions on legal questions. Sparf v.
United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
16. For consideration of the changes, see MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL
ADMINIsTRATION 224-34 (Vanderbilt ed. 1949); and series of articles probing
into these matters by Curtis Wright, Jr: The Invasion of Jury : Temperature of
the War, 27 TEiP. L.Q. 137 (1953); Instructions to the Jury: Suntmary Without
Comment, 1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 177; Adequacy of Instructions to the Jury, 53
MICH. L. REV. 505, 813 (1955). For an interesting discussion of the responsibil-
ities of the trial judge at common law, see Brown, Judicial Independence, 12
A.B.A. REP. 265, 272, 276 (1889).
17. In 1927 a committee of the Commonwealth Fund which had studied the
needs for reforms of the law of evidence, considered as basic to such reforms the
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The popular election of judges inevitably compelled all judicial can-
didates to take to the hustings, to work with all manner of candidates
on a partisan ticket for every position from presidential elector to
hogreeve and dogcatcher, and to become involved in their innumerable
little deals for votes. The process of judicial selection became inex-
tricably mixed with local, state, and national politics. I recall a judge
wryly telling how he had been elected by--or with-Woodrow Wilson
and later defeated by Warren Harding.
This radical change in the method of judicial selection need not
have come about had the judges and lawyers of the time been alert to
their responsibilities. In the Jacksonian Era in New Jersey there were
only four professionally trained judges-a chancellor and three su-
preme court justices-but in the Constitutional Convention of 1844
these few judges and the leaders of the bar, in the face of the almost
universal trend toward elected judges, brought about the adoption of
a constitution providing for judges appointed by the governor subject
to confirmation by the Senate. The state had had unsatisfactory ex-
perience with legislatively elected judges, as had others, and the bench
and bar had no reason to believe that popular elections would prove
any better, despite the contrary belief in other states."5 The failure of
the bench and bar in most states in this period to recognize their pro-
fessional responsibility still plagues us. With the exception of Soviet
Russia and its satellites, ours is the only country in the civilized world
that elects its judges. In the popular election of judges we stand apart
from all of the other countries where either the common law or the
civil law holds sway. The plain truth that we have been slow in recog-
nizing is that the Jacksonian Revolution, in every respect except that
it involved no bloodshed, was far more drastic than the Revolution of
enactment of a uniform statute providing that: "The trial judge may express
to the jury, after the close of the evidence and arguments, his opinion as to the
weight and credibility of the evidence or any part thereof." MORGAN, THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE 9 (1927). The MODEL CODE OF ]VIDENCE, prepared by the American
Law Institute in 1942, embodies a similar provision in rule 8. In 1938 theAmerican Bar Association took the lead in recommending "that after the evi-
dence has been closed and counsel have concluded their arguments to the jury, the
trial judge should instruct the jury orally as to the law of the case, and should
have power to advise them as to the facts by summarizing and analyzing the
evidence and commenting upon the weight and credibility of the evidence or upon
any part of it, always leaving the final decision on questions of fact to the jury."
Section of Judicial Administration, Report, 63 A.B.A. REP. 523 (1938). The
UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE approved in 1953 are deficient in this regard and
fail to contain a provision directed at restoring to the trial judge his common-law
powers. HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COImSSIONERS ON UNIFORm!
STATE LAWS 162 (1953).
18. L. Q. C. ELMR, THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNTENT OF THE PROVINCE AND
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, WITH BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE GOVERNORS FROM
1776 TO 1845 AND REMINISCENCES OF THE BENCH AND BAR, DURING MORE THAN
HALF A CENTURY 33, 318, 334-36, 396-98 (1872) (commonly known as ELMER'S
REMINISCENCES). As to another state's belief that the change to election from
the legislative selection would be an improvement, see Smith ed., op. cit. supra
note 10.
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1776, particularly in the field of law; and we have not yet recovered
from it. 9
Few judges have dared to tell the naked truth about the elective
system either in the large cities or in the rural areas of the several
states. In New York City alone the people are called upon to elect 182
judges, 33 or more candidates appearing on the ballot at a time ;20 ob-
viously the electorate could not personally know that number of can-
didates, whose selections, of course, were made by the political bosses.
There is no pretense that the best available men are nominated. Every
year the newspapers deprecate the process editorially; some of the bar
associations ineffectively endeavor to enlighten the public as to the
"best choices"; and almost every year history repeats itself.2' The sit-
uation is not peculiar to the large cities alone. Just a few months ago
a courageous judge had this to say to his friends in the Iowa State
Bar Foundation:
The situation is even worse in the country. The lawyers control
the nomination of the judges, and in many rural counties one of
the lawyers is politically prominent who holds the delegation in
his hand. You ought to sit in this spot: on one side of the table in
a close case is a political nobody. On the other side is a man who
controls your job. It is a farce to call this a system of justice
where the employer of the judge is on one side of the table. That
is your rural system.22
We should not be surprised to find that in a nationwide Gallup poll
taken a few years ago the results showed that only 86% believed the
federal judges to be honest, 76% the state judges, and 72% the muni-
cipal or local judges. 23 When to this expression of opinion on the ques-
tion of honesty is added the obvious fact that the characteristics that
19. "Jacksonian Democracy demanded that the courts, the lawyers, and the
law be made subservient to the popular will." ENGLISH, op. cit. supra note 8, at
91. See also WHITE, THE JEFFERSoNIANs, A STUDy IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
1801-1829, at viii (1951), commenting that 1829 marked the end of an epoch:
"The gentlemen who since 1789 had taken the responsibility of government were
driven fromi the scene, to be replaced by a new type of public servant and by
other ideals of official action."
20. Editorial, Selection of Judges, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1955, p. 18 col. 3 As
to the fantasy in the popular selection of judges in New York see letter from
Allen T. Kots, President of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
to Harrison Tweed, Chairman of the Temporary Commission on the Courts(N.Y.), March 28, 1956, where he points out that the results of a poll taken in
New York City and elsewhere in New York State revealed that most voters could
not recall immediately after election day the names of the men for whom they
voted in the judicial contest and could not even remember the name of the man
they voted for as chief judge of the state's highest court. As to politics in the
selection of judicial candidates, see Fox, Judges and Politics, 27 TEmP. L.Q. 1(1953); Kales, Methods of Selecting and Retiring Judges, 11 J. Am. JUD. S00'Y
133 (1929).
21. See, e.g., MARTIN, THE ROLE OF THE BAR IN ELECTING THE BENCH IN
CHICAGO 21-112, 175-210, 362-63 (1936).
22. Address by Judge Harvey Uhlenhopp, midwinter meeting of the Board
of Directors of the Iowa State Bar Foundation, Nov. 30, 1955.
23. Am. Institute of Public Opinion, Surveys, 1938-1989, 3 PuB. OPIN. Q. 581,
595 (1939).
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make an appeal in popular elections do not necessarily insure the
choice of the most competent judges, we can well understand one of
the chief causes of dissatisfaction of the people with our judicial sys-
tem. The qualities that make for judicial competence are not likely to
be found impressive on the platform, and the steps one has to take to
obtain a party nomination are not likely to be compatible with the com-
plete independence that is an indispensable requirement for a good
judge.-" Moreover, many desirable potential judges who would accept
an appointment to the bench are disinclined to encounter the recurring
hazards of a political campaign for election, and so the field of choice is
unfortunately narrowed. Nor do the drawbacks disappear following
election; in many states the county judge is forced to act as the unof-
ficial, though actual, leader of his political party in the county, if he
wishes to have a chance for re-election-an intolerable situation inevi-
tably known to the citizenry. It has truthfully been said that a judge
must not only be honest, but he must be believed to be honest. What
must the public think of such enforced political activity on the part of
a judge? In spite of various attempts to improve the techniques for
the election of judges, such as the nonpartisan ballot, partisan pres-
sures are inescapable wherever judges are elected. "The selection of
a .I udge by this method is not only influenced by politics; it is politics
itself."-';
Popular, partisan judicial elections would have long since broken
down were it not for the fact that about one-third of the judges die in
24. For evidence of what may be iequired to win an election and distaste for
such activities, see BOK, BACKBONE OF THE HOMING 44-49, 285-91 (1941). See
also for paity demands, MIARTIN, op. cit. supra note 21, at 251-58. For a per-
suasiv, indictment against the system of popular election of judges, see Mem-
orandum submitted b-y the Justices of the City Court of the City of New York,
Feb. 29, 19,56, in support of legislation to increase their salaries where they
admit to a lack of independence in these terms:
The process by which one is chosen for the Bench has always been con-
side ed a most important determinant of the amount of compensation which
should be paid the incumbent. Consequently, appointive judicial officers
have been accorded less pay than elective judicial officers; and judges elected
from a district within a county have always received less pay than judges
clected on a county-wide basis.
Each City Couit justice, just like each judge in the Court of General
Sessions and each Surrogate and each judge in the four County Courts, has
ascended the Bench by having been elected to office by the majority of votes
of an entire county. The significance of this as regards financial pressures
coming fron a largse area anda from innumerable applicants is well kmown.
In order for any candidate to elective office to win in a county-wide contest,
it is necessaryfor him to have solicited and used active aid and cooperation
of niany organizations and individuals: political, civic, religious, labor, fra-
ternal, social welfare, and many others. This means that after ascending
the Be~nch and as long as he remains on it, the City Court justice, like any
other justice elected on a county-wide basis, is met with demands for con-
tributions and subscriptions to various worthy causes in which his former
helpers ate active participants. Frequently these are demands which he
cannot refuse and where pleading lack of money is not accepted as a satis-
factory excuse.
2.. Erskine, The Selection of Judges in England: A Standard for Comparison,
:19 A.B.A.J. 279, 348 (1953).
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office or resign, thereby giving the governor an opportunity to make
ad interim appointments. These temporary appointees as a group are
likely to be much better than the judges elected in partisan elections.
When they run for election at the end of their ad interim appoint-
ments, the prestige of their position aids materially in their election. 20
In this manner the caliber of the judiciary is somewhat improved over
what it might otherwise be, but not sufficiently so to overcome the
shortcomings of the elective system.
.Unquestionably there are many honest and competent elected
judges, but it is in spite of, rather than by reason of, the method of
their selection. Nor would I contend that the appointive system as
practiced in the United States is perfect. We must admit that political
influences are of prime importance in this country wherever judges
are appointed by the executive,2 7 but the elimination of such partisan
considerations is the basic aim of all who are interested in improving
the administration of justice. It is possible for undesirable political
influences to be eliminated from the appointive system. All that is
needed is to have the bar assert itself to demand good judges. No
amount of such assertion from the bar will result in good elective
judges, since for this it is necessary to inform and mobilize public
opinion, and the selection of the numerous judges necessary cannot be
expected to be of such interest as to lead to public action except under
peculiar circumstances or where an outstanding office is to be filled.
However, under the appointive system, the organized bar, without en-
croaching on the executive, can advise as to the qualifications of those
who are being considered. 28 The requirement in Massachusetts and
New Jersey that there be an interval of seven days between nomina-
tion of a judge by the governor and action on that nomination by the
confirming body, allows such advisement and places the responsibility
on the bar to act.29
The fundamental question as to how judges are to be selected is
more than a question of who is best able to determine the qualifications
of a potential judge. It involves the determination of how political
considerations and partisan pressures may. be eliminated from the
process. Party regularity and service should not be the basis of receiv-
ing the office of judge. Since judges are not essentially representa-
tives of the people as are legislators and the executive, judges, on prin-
26. Vanderbilt ed., op. cit. supra note 16, at 8, 27; Tunstall, Why Ignore the
Bar? 38 VA. L. Rv. 1091, 1098-99, 1108-09 (1952).
27. See WARNER & CABOT, JUDGE S AND LAw REFORm 11, 182-85 (1936); Evans,
Political Influences in the Selection of Federal Judges, 1948 Wis. L. REV. 380;
Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision and Removal, 28 Micii. L.
REV. 485 (1930).
28. As to the effectiveness of consultation of the State Bar by then Governor
Warren, see Smith, The C.alifornia Method of Electing Judges, 3 STAN. L. REV.
571, 597, 600 (1951).
29. MASS. CONST. art. IX, § 68; N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 6(1).
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ciple, should be chosen on a nonpartisan basis. In England appoint-
ments by the Crown to judicial office formerly were greatly influenced
by political considerations. Recently, however, this has been changed
and English judges are now selected on the basis of merit without con-
sideration of party, as indicated by Lord Chancellor Jowitt's eighty-
one appointments to judicial office, which included only two members
of his own Labor Party:.' The administration of justice should not be
vested in a single party in any community. Accordingly, bipartisan
appointments are the best way of proving to the public that one party
does not control the courts and that the courts are not in politics.31
The matter is of special importance in the decision of highly contro-
versial political issues. If all the judges in a bipartisan court, regard-
less of party affiliations, concur in the decision of such an issue, as
they frequently do, their decision carries a weight that an opinion
from a partisan bench could not possibly do.
The problem of the tenure to be accorded those who hold judicial
office is inextricably interrelated with the question of the mode of se-
lection. Limitations on judicial tenure were the first expedient of a
people critical of their courts and desirous of influencing and control-
ling judicial selection. Historically, short terms of office have gone
hand in hand with the selection of judges by the electorate.32 But in
actual practice where the judicial term is short, it is more likely that
judges will use the office as a rung on the political ladder, a mere step
in a political career. Just because the judicial task is a specialized one
for which, however, in the common-law system, no special training is
given or required,z3 it is most important for a judge to be able to de-
:30. Erskine, supra note 25, at 280-81. Erskine comments that the other
seventy-nine appointees were not necessarily active conservatives but were prob-
ably non-political.
31. In Delaware a provision for a bipartisan bench is included in the Con-
stitution (art. IV, § 3). In New Jersey a bipartisan judiciary is a matter of
tradition and practice in the supreme and superior courts. See speech of Senator
Smith of New Jersey, 97 CONG. REC. 3473 (1951). In the county courts when
there are several judges in the county a bipartisan bench is required by statute.
N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:. -14 (1952).
:;2, For limitation on judicial tenure, see CARPENTER, op. cit. supra note 11,
at 17 '-79; HAYNES, op. cit. supra note 7, at 100.
:33. The common-law courts' lack of requirement of special qualifications of
expet ience or training contrasts with that in other countries. It is to be noted,
of course, that in England as compared with the United States there is a limita-
tion on the group of law-trained personnel from which the judges are selected.
In England "only barristers are eligible for appointment; and not only is this
class itself small, but its leaders are bound to be known." HAYNES, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 149.
In the continental civil-law countries the judicial career is a specialized pro-
fession for which certain training is required, and prior so-called "judicial" ex-
perience is necessary for all, except for the initial appointment to a minor court.
The judicial profession includes not only judges but prosecutors and those who
staff the Ministry of Justice which administers the court system, and the judicial
experience necessary to promotion to the higher courts may include assignment
to any of these tasks. See generally ENSOR, COURTS AND JUDGES IN FRANcE,
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vote years in office, gradually increasing his understanding and com-
petence. The testimony of Justice Henry I. Lummus on this point is
interesting. His judicial career has included fourteen years as a part-
time judge of a district court in Massachusetts, a trial court of limited
jurisdiction, during which period he continued also to practice law;
eleven years on the superior court, the trial court of general jurisdic-
tion; and to date twenty-four years on the highest appellate bench in
Massachusetts. He says:
Being a judge ought to be a career in itself, and not merely an in-
terlude in the practice of law or the holding of political office. It
ought to be a stepping stone to nothing except a higher judicial
office. Forty years, I think, is the ideal age for the beginning of
a judicial career in the higher trial courts in America.... For his
first few years on the bench, at least, a judge ought to devote all
his spare time to the study of law and practice. His whole view-
point changes when he dons the robe. His search is for truth, and
not for usable arguments. Many things look different from the
bench. Being a judge is a different profession from being a law-
yer.... 4
In the long period from 1848 on, the only important advances in
judicial selection and tenure in this country are the provisions of the.
New Jersey Constitution of 1947 giving judges of the supreme and
superior courts tenure during good behavior after a trial term of
seven years,35 and the selection of judges by the plan variously known
as the Missouri or California or American Bar- Association plan.',
The essence of this plan is that vacancies are filled by appointment
GERMANY AND ENGLAND (1933) ; Ploscowe, The Career of Judges and Prosecutors
in Continental Countries, 44 YALE L.J. 268 (1934).
In the United States where judges are selected from the legal profession at
large as contrasted with the English limitation and the continental practice, it
may be wise to inquire whether it is not too much to expect that a man selected,
as many judges are, from office practice, be expert in conducting the trial of
eases or the hearing or disposition of appeals. See Marx, Justice is Ezpensive,
36 J. AM. JuD. Soc'y 75 (1952). In this matter the postwar experience of Japan
which owes much to its earlier civil-law background as well as the present
American influence, may be of interest. There, a Judicial Research and Training
Institute, supervised by the Supreme Court-a development of an earlier institu-
tion-has been concerned with the retraining of judges in the law of the new
constitution and postwar legislation, training assistant judges, research byjudges in special designated subjects, and the training of judicial apprentices.
This latter group includes persons aiming to be judges, public prosecutors, and
lawyers who have passed the bar examination. The two-year training course
which is in addition to the university legal education, is primarily a practical
training in law firms, public prosecutors' offices, and in the courts. T. HATTORI, A
SUMMARY OF THE SYSTEM OF THE JUDICIAL RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE
OF JAPAN (unpublished manuscript in Chief Justice Vanderbilt's files 1946). See
also Oppler, The Reform of Japan's Legal and Judicial System Under Allied
Occpation, 24 WASH. L. REV. 290, 305-17 (1949).
34. LummUs, THE TRIAL JUDGE 38-39 (1937).
35. Art. 6, § 6(3).
36. See recommendations, Special Committee on Judicial Selection and Tenure,
Report, 62 A.B.A. REP. 893-97 (1937); Second Meeting of the House of Delegates,Proceedings, id. at 1026, 1033; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION, HANDBOOK ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE 80-88 (3d ed. 1952).
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through a commission composed of high judicial officers and other
citizens. At the end of this term the judge runs, not against the
field, but on his own record. The question on the ballot is: "Shall
Judge Blank be retained in office?" Unfortunately, it has been adopted
only in two states-in both California 7 and Missouri for the appellate
courts and in Missouri also for the trial courts in the two largest
counties." Even such a plan may not in itself be a guarantee against
political interferences. That the vigilance of the bar and the public
must be constant was illustrated recently in Missouri where the plan
has operated satisfactorily for more than fifteen years. Efforts to per-
vert the plan were almost successful. Fortunately, the action of the
bar in changing its representative on the nominating commission and
the action of the governor in going outside his own party for two out
of three appointments saved the day. 9 The practice of the political
election of judges has gone on in most of our states so long that it has
come to be regarded as normal, whereas, as we have seen, it is truly
exceptional both in the common law and the civil law. Any attempt,
however, to provide for appointed judges would be played up by the
politicians as an effort to deprive the people of a great right, although
in most places the power of the people to elect their own judges is
sheer illusion.""
Here we find ourselves face to face with the first great impasse in
the administration of justice in this country. Judges should be the
leaders in every phase of improving the work of the courts. As it has
worked out in practice, the popular election of judges resulting from
the Jacksonian Revolution has served for well over a century, almost
everywhere, to stifle judicial leadership and bar support for court re-
37. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 26 (1934). See Special Committee on JudicialSelectiorn and Tenure, Report, 63 A.B.A. REP. 420-21 (1938). Appointments are
made by the governor subject to confirmation by the Commission on Qualifica-
tions. T'he procedure is also available for the selection of superior court judges
in any county upon approval of the electorate but has not yet been so adopted.
For history of the constitutional provision and appointments thereunder, see
Smith, ,-pr- note 28.
38. Mo. CONST. art. V, §§ 29(a)-(g). The governor makes the appointment
from a panel of nominees sugested by the commission. The plan originally was
adopted in 1940. For comments on its operation, see PELTASON, THE MISSOURI
PLAN FOR THE SELECTION OF JUDGES (20 U. of Mo. Studies No. 2, 1945); Bund-
schu, The A i.-souri Non-Partisan Court Plan-Selection and Tenure of Judges,
16 U. KAN. CITY L. REX'. 55 (1948) ; Hyde, Missouri Plan for Selection and Tenure
of Judges, 9 F.R.D. 457 (1950).
This plan has also been adopted for the selection of circuit court judges in
Birmingham, Alabama. See AmERICAN BAR AssocLATION, op. cit. supra note 36,
at 81.
39. For editorial approval of the governor's action, see Kansas City Star-
Times, Feb. 8, 1956. Another example of a governor's appointment outside his
party is reported in Non-Partisan Selection of Judges in Missouri, 37 J. Am.
Jun. Soc'Y 99 (93.See also Hyde, supra note 38, at 464-65, indicating that
the predominance of a party's vote for other officials did not affect the retention
in office of judges of the opposite party.
40. N.Y. Times, April 20, 1956, p. 1, col. 1, reporting on lectures given by
Federal Judge Harold R. Medina.
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form. Judges cannot be expected to attack the method of judicial se-
lection by which incumbents of judicial office must be elected, yet obvi-
ously the method of judicial selection must be the first point of attack.
The record of a century and a quarter shows that except in rare in-
stances we may not hope for progress here.
The second great impasse in the administration of justice is not so
formidable nor, I must add as a law school man, so humanly excusa-
ble as the default of the judges. In the law schools the fundamental
problems of court organization, personnel, procedure, and administra-
tion have been quite neglected since the introduction of the case sys-
tem of law study three-quarters of a century ago. As a result not only
the law school students of today but many generations of lawyers know
next to nothing of judicial administration. Here I must confess the
embarrassment I feel when I meet and talk to foreign jurists and law
students over here seeking to learn improved methods for the adminis-
tration of justice. In many ways their systems surpass ours, though
in others they do not. But what embarrasses me is their great interest
in these problems and their desire to learn from other systems of law,
while here the profession as a whole shows no interest in improving
judicial administration, much less any desire to study the subject com-
paratively and to learn from others. This inertia of the profession,
and in many instances its active opposition to needed procedural and
administrative reform in the face of widespread popular complaint
and dissatisfaction, must be ascribed in large part to the shortcomings
of the legal education of its members.
How are we to account for this strange anomaly-the best law
schools in the world, yet with the least interest in improving the ad-
ministration of justice? The answer is that the case system of law
study, the adoption of which chanced to parallel the development of
our industrial civilization, was so admirably adapted to the teaching
of the substantive law of our business civilization, and the demand for
such education has been so great, that almost everything else once in
the law school curriculum has tended to be neglected, especially the
critical study of procedure. Fifty years ago we were taught just
enough of the elements of common-law pleading- demurrers, trav-
erses, pleas in confession and avoidance, novel assignment, and de-
parture-to enable us to read and grasp the procedure of the cases in
the substantive law we were studying in, other courses. The only
things I can remember of that course are that we were told that it
was demurrable to plead that one threw a stone gently, but that it was
not demurrable to plead that the events alleged in the declaration oc-
curred on the Island of Minorca, to wit, in the Parish of St. Mary le
Bow in the Ward of Cheap at London, provided one did it under a
1videlicet! The jurisdiction of the courts and what was really going on
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there was a mystery never revealed to me while I was in law school,
though I soon came to know that if I wanted to be a real lawyer I had
better learn every aspect of these matters. The best clients often know
more about the substantive law of their business than their lawyers;
they come to their lawyers because they want advice on procedure and
especially on whether to settle or fight.
A quarter of a century passed by before the law schools saw the need
of teaching anything about the organization of the courts or the fun-
damentals of actions at law, suits in equity, and procedure under the
codes of procedure. It was not until the last three or four years, how-
ever, that the significance of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be-
gan to be recognized by a few of the law schools. But not even to this
day do the law schools generally concern themselves with the funda-
mental problems of the essential reforms of judicial administration
and especially with the need of overcoming the shortcomings of the
courts with respect to which the public has become most articulate.4'
I can best illustrate the extent of the allergy against procedure that
actuates every branch of the profession by citing to you an incident
that occurred in 1938 when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
promulgated, ushering in an entirely new type of procedure in the
United States courts with which lawyers generally were quite unac-
quainted. Western Reserve University Law School in Cleveland, situ-
ated in the population center of the nation, collaborated with the
American Bar Association in giving a course of lectures on the new
practice which was to govern proceedings in all of the federal trial
courts, with outstanding members of the Advisory Committee of the
United States Supreme Court as lecturers. Imagine my surprise when
less than 500 lawyers in the entire country registered for the course,
even though it was free and given in July when court engagements
and the press of professional obligations would least interfere.42
This particular deficiency of the average lawyer was, in truth, fore-
shadowed in the law schools. When all we were taught about pro-
cedure was a few fundamentals Without connecting them with the rest
of our world, can the bar be altogether blamed for not taking a burn-
ing interest in the problems of the organization of courts, judicial se-
lection, and simplified procedure? The average lawyer's aversion to
all these problems originates generally in his law school work. The
courses in procedure are likely to be the most unpopular in the cur-
riculum, taught by the latest arrival on the faculty only until another
new arrival appears on the scene. This is due largely to the fact that
41. A pioneer course oriented in this direction is discussed in BROWN, LAW-
YERS, LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE 137-39 (1948).
42. AM_. BAR. ASs'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES 177(Dawson ed. 1938). This course was given just before the annual meeting onJuly 25, 1938, of the Am. Bar Ass'n which in that year had 30,820 members, of
whom 2,706 attended the meeting. 63 A.B.A. REP,. 185, 849 (1938).
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what little procedure has been taught, has traditionally been presented
historically and for the benefit of the courses in substantive law. This
predilection for the historical approach has unfortunately led the be-
ginning student in the law over a rough road through the technicali-
ties and complexities of the various forms of action at common law
which are of no importance today except for the light they shed on the
principles of contract, torts, and property. No attempt is made to re-
late the principles of procedure to the present-day work of the
.ourts.
43
Lest my remarks be taken as reflecting on the teaching in the law
schools, let me hasten to say that they are not so intended. I have said
many times before, and I hasten to reaffirm my conviction now, that
nowhere in the whole realm of higher education do more minds come
to life than through the study of law under the case system. As Dr.
Joseph Redlich, who examined carefully the methods of legal educa-
tion in the civil law and common law countries, said of Langdell's case
method, it "really teaches the pupil to think in the way that any prac-
tical lawyer-whether dealing with written or with unwritten law-
ought to and has to think... ."4 However, I am sure that no good law
school would lightly deny the present-day importance of any of the
subjects I have been mentioning or fail to see that if the future law-
yer's interest in them is not aroused while he is in law school the
chances are against his ever mastering them-especially inasmuch as
the large majority of the students will rarely enter the courtroom but
will devote themselves to office practice. The parallel, however, be-
tween the shortcomings of the average lawyer and the failure of the
law schools to deal with these matters does raise the embarrassing
question of whether the law schools have not erred in the past in let-
ting the legal profession, through the boards of bar examiners, shape
the curriculum, just as our business civilization has in turn too largely
dictated the standards of the profession. However that may be, the
fact remains that the subjects germane to our business civilization
have dominated the law school curriculum to the detriment of both
procedure in the broadest sense and the administration of justice.
43. I am not arguing that knowledge of the forms of action is not essential to
an understanding of the common law for, as Maitland truly said, these "we have
buried, but they still rule us from their graves." MAITLAND, THE FoRis OF
AcTioN AT CosoN LAW 2 (1936). However, their importance today is not for
procedure but for the substantive law.
44. REDLICH, THE COAMrION LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN UNIVER-
siry LAw ScHooLs 39 (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching,
Bull. No. 8, 1914). While recognizing that American law schools' primary func-
tion was to train students for legal practice, Redlich thought Langdell's reforms
developed a new "calling, that of the non-practising law teachers of America,"
and he visualized these new legal scholars with the aid of lawyers and judges
creating "a scientific system of the common law, and a reform of... substantive
law,7 as well as of civil, and criminal proccedure." Id. at 63. See also Redlich's
pregnant comments as to the need to widen the scope of the law school course
if law reforms are to succeed. Id. at 65.
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Realizing how difficult, indeed, how well-nigh impossible, it is to
bring about court reform through judges and practicing lawyers, my
thesis is that, if we are ever to make the progress we should in im-
proving the administration of justice, we must have the aid of the law
schools. Surely they have no greater duty than to save the courts.
There is nothing novel about this. In 1932, before he became a judge,
Professor Frankfurter had this to say:
But, when all is said and done, the law schools ought to have, if
they have not, dominant influence in the directions pursued by
the bar, and in fashioning the standards which lawyers observe
and not merely profess. And the bench fundamentally is always
an offspring of the bar. Not the least function of law schools, and
of the profession which they nurture, is the influence which they
ought to exert on lay opinion regarding the requirements of legal
administration and the qualities that ought to be demanded for
the judicial office. 45
Unhappily this perfectly reasonable goal for the law schools has
scarcely been recognized.
What has been done over the past half-century since Dean Pound
sounded his clarion call has been largely the work of a relatively few
men. primarily in the federal field. For nearly twenty years Thomas
W. Shelton led a crusade for an act to give the United States Supreme
Court the same kind of rule-making power in actions at law that it
had long exercised in equity, thus avoiding the evils of the Comform-
ity Act,", only to face year after year the opposition of Senator
Thomas J. Walsh, then Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Shelton died before the battle was won, but in 1934 Attorney General
Homer S. Cummings, who by a strange quirk of history and judicial
good fortune was Walsh's successor as Attorney General, sponsored
the act that resulted in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.47
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure followed in 1946.48 Mean-
time, largely through Attorney General Cummings' leadership, the
act establishing the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
-the first of its kind in this country-was passed.4 In 1938 seven
distinguished committees of the American Bar Association dealing
with various phases of judicial administration, under the leadership of
John J. Parker, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, made thoroughgoing reports on minimum stand-
ards of judicial administration which were unanimously adopted, save
for a single provision, by the American Bar Association as its contin-
45. Frankfurter, Book Review, 45 H.tv. L. REv. 596, 597 (1932).46. Act of June 1, 1872, c. 255, § 5, 17 STAT. 197.
47. See Cummings, Imrnediate Problems for the Bar, 20 A.B.A.J. 212 (1934);
Sunderland, The Grant of Rule-Making Power to the Supreme Court of tihe
United Stafe.s, 32 MicH. L. REv. 1116 (1934).
48. See Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: I, 55 YL L.
J. 694 (1946).
49. 53 STAT. 1223 (1939), 3 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (1952).
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uing program for the state courts. 0 In 1947 New Jersey modernized
its judicial structure and practice with a view to eliminating popular
complaints in a movement led by laymen, and in 1951 Delaware did the
same thing under the leadership of its bar. On the basis of its accept-
ance of the American Bar Association's minimum standards of judi-
cial administration, Missouri likewise ranks high. Outstanding are its
adoption of a nonpartisan plan for the selection of judges and its re-
cent replacement of its justice of the peace with magistrate courts
staffed by judges who must be lawyers.51 In judicial administration
the more that is done the more seemingly remains to be done. Mis-
souri has already achieved the major objectives, but it still needs a
chief justice with continuity in office, a full-time administrative office,
simplified jury laws, the restoration of the trial judge's common-law
powers, and the abolition of the present limitations on discovery be-
fore trial. In these three states, however, as well as in the federal sys-
tem, many of the objectives for improved judicial administration are
being substantially accomplished. It is significant that all of these
jurisdictions in which great strides in judicial reform have been made
have judges who are not, for the most part, selected by popular elec-
tion.
The improvement of the administration of justice is too vital a mat-
ter to wait for the achievements of individual men or small groups of
leaders in their respective states. The bar as a whole must be educated
with respect to the fundamental problems of the courts and its re-
sponsibility for their solution. Frederic W. Maitland long ago told
us: "Taught law is tough law.' 52 In the field of judicial adminis-
tration there has been very little "tough law"-indeed, little pro-
cedural law of any kind has emanated from the law schools over the
last century. I appreciate the competition for time in the law school
curriculum, but I agree wholeheartedly with Mr. Justice Frankfurter
as to the responsibilities of the law schools for exerting their influence
on the bar as well as on lay opinion regarding judicial administra-
tion. Fortunately, the essentials of the underlying problems are so
simple, the ideals to be attained have been so clearly stated, the reme-
dies have been so well defined, and the amount of time which will be
taken up in presenting these matters is relatively so small, that I can-
not believe that the law schools will longer attempt to justify their
apathy. They have the power as well as the duty to break their im-
passe; it is to them alone that we must look for nationwide leadership.
50. Section of Judicial Administration, Report, 63 A.B.A. REP. 522 (1938). See
Vanderbilt ed., op. cit. supra note 16, for summary of status of the states as based
on their standards.
51. As to the Missouri plan for judicial selection see note 38 supra. The re-
levant provisions governing the magistrate's courts are to be found in Mo. CONST.
art. V, §§ 18-21, 24 25; Mo. Rav. STAT. c. 482 (1949).
52. MAITLAND, ENGLISH LAW AND THE RENAISSANCE 18 (Rede Lecture 1901).
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I shall devote the rest of this lecture to outlining some of the princi-
pal problems of judicial reform that have resulted from the great im-
passes in justice, the solution of which, in my judgment, is the pri-
mary obligation the law schools owe to the law and to the legal profes-
sion as well as to the public. I shall deal with these problems in two
groups, the first centering chiefly around the causes of popular dis-
satisfaction with the courts, the second dealing with problems with
which we all should be very much concerned, but with reference to
whi\ch 1)oth the profession and the public have been relatively indiffer-
ont.
II
The essentials for the sound administration of justice today are:
(1 ) a simple system of courts; (2) competent judges and jurors; (3)
the use of judicial manpower in the most effective manner through an
administrative head of the courts; (4) a simple flexible procedure
aimed at securing a decision of every case on the merits and avoiding
undue delay, technicalities and surprise; and (5) an effective appellate
practice. These principles apply to both the administration of civil
andl criminal justice.
(1) The work of the best bench and bar can be greatly handicapped
by a multiplicity of courts with overlapping jurisdictions.-5 Lord Coke
lists seventy-four courts in his Fourth Institute, but three are all that
are needed in a modern judicial establishment: a local court of limited
civil and criminal jurisdiction, a trial court of general statewide juris-
diction, and an appellate court with an intermediate court or courts of
appeal depending on the needs of the particular state.
(2) I have already spoken at length of the need of well trained in-
dependent, impartial judges. Honest and intelligent juries, represent-
ing a cross-section of the honest and intelligent citizenry of a county,
are as essential to the administration of justice as upright and learned
judges. It is a mockery of justice to go through the form of a trial
with a dishonest or unintelligent juror in the jury box. The jury is an
integral part of the administration of justice and the selection of the
panel from which juries are drawn should therefore be entrusted to
the courts or to commissioners appointed by the courts. This has been
done in thirty-three states, but in the remaining fifteen states the se-
lection of the jury panel is in political hands, with the inevitable re-
sultant dangers to the administration of justice. In many states the
53. For a history of American developments, see generally POUND, ORGANIZA-
TION OF COURTS (1940). For an analysis of the basic court structure of the various
states, see Miller, The Judicial Structures in the "Common Law" State: A Com-
paratie Analys is, 7 LA. L. REV. 490 (1947). For examples of the problems of
courts in metropolitan areas, see LEPAWSKY, THE JUDICIAL SYSTEI OF METRO-
POLITAN CHICAGO (1932); N.Y. CITY BAR ASS'N, BAD HOUSEKEEPING, THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE NEW YORK COURTS (1955); VIRTUE, SURVEY OF MEMO-
POLITAN COURTS, DETROIT AREA (1950).
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jury laws are antiquated and complicated. Qualifications for service
and exemptions from service are frequently without rhyme or reason.
Alternate jurors are not often provided for. It is difficult to under-
stand why there has been so much neglect of matters so essential to
effective judicial administration."
(3) Although, as we have seen, only three courts are called for, in-
stead of the many courts with special jurisdictions as we have even
now in many states, there should be considerable specialization by
judges in the trial courts in metropolitan areas. It is impossible for a
trial judge to be an expert in every field of trial practice. Without lim-
iting the general jurisdiction of each trial judge to dispose of all the is-
sues in any case assigned to him, sound reason dictates that he should
be assigned in general to a division of his court specializing in the kind
of work for which he is best qualified-criminal, civil (generally with
a jury), equity, probate, juvenile, traffic, and the like. Some very good
equity judges shrink from jury work and some very good law judges
dislike equity. For sound judicial administration, therefore, someone
should have the power to assign the judges to the work for which they
are best fitted and where they are needed. The exercise of this power
will result in the creation of several groups of specialist judges-ap-
pellate judges, law judges who customarily function with a jury,
equity judges, and matrimonial judges. It is sheer waste of time and
effort to have judges rotating from one kind of work to another. Each
kind of judicial work involves not only special knowledge but special
techniques. Each member, moreover, of a group of specialist judges
learns much from another. The ideal is to assign each judge to the
kind of work he likes and can do best. Because this power of assign-
ment is a delicate one to be exercised only on mature reflection for the
best interest of the judicial establishment as a whole, it may best be
committed to the chief judicial officer in the state and he, in turn,
would do well to seek the advice of his colleagues, even though the
ultimate responsibility for assignments must be solely his.
Equally important in the management of a judicial system is the
exercise of the power by the administrative head of the courts to as-
sign the judges where they are most needed. Not only is it ridiculous
to have some judges half-idle while others are falling behind with their
work, but here we have made the interesting discovery that two judges
54. For the facts as to jury selection and jury service, see Vanderbilt ed., op.
cit. supra note 16, at 146-206. An investigation of the jury system is currently
being conducted at the University of Chicago Law School. See Meltzer, A Pro-jected Study of the Jury as a Working Institution, 287 ANNALS 97 (1953). See
also Note, Psychological Tests and Standards of Competence for Selecting Jurors,
65 YALE L.J. 531 (1956), viewing current criticism of juries inadequacies as
following from weaknesses in jurors' selection, the result of vague statutory
qualifications and antiquated methods of selection and suggesting the adoption
of standards of jury competence and the use of objective tests to assess jurors'
qualifications in order to improve the operation of the jury system.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss3/1
IMPASSES IN JUSTICE
sitting in the same courthouse and working on a common calendar can
try half again as many cases as these same two judges can try sitting
in different courthouses and working on separate calendars. The phe-
nomenon continues up to the limit of trial judges available, the court-
rooms available, the number of trial lawyers available, and the number
of cases awaiting trial.
To know what each judge is doing and where judges are most
needed requires current statistics week by week as well as quarterly
and annually. 5 To assist him in this work the chief justice requires an
administrative director of the courts to handle all of its business af-
fairs. The courts are the only statewide business operating in most
jurisdictions without any semblance of business management. The
wonder is that they have done as well as they have. An awareness of
the need of a business manager in the courts is gradually being under-
stood by the entire country. Since 1939 administrative offices have
been established in seventeen jurisdictions. G In all the jurisdictions
where such offices have been established, the bench and bar and the
people are unwilling to return to the former lack of method. But false
notions of democracy still operate to prevent this in some states. In
the Jacksonian period so extreme were the notions of equality that it
was deemed undemocratic that one judge should be permanently des-
ignated as chief justice. Today, in twelve states the chief justice
shifts every year or two, and in two states every six months. 57 Imagine
trying to run any other large statewide business on such a basis. It
will do little good to create administrative offices if the responsible
head of the courts shifts on such short intervals. Last year Michigan
abandoned this absurdity, showing that progress is possible even un-
der the elective system. Only false judicial vanity stands in the way
of this much needed improvement.
(4a) With competent judges and jurors and adequate administra-
tive powers, it is not a difficult matter to overcome popular complaints
as to the law. The law's delays have been by all odds the greatest
source of these complaints. One of the most annoying forms of this
evil is the failure of the judge to open court on time and to stay on the
bench attending to court business throughout the appointed hours of
the day. This offense yields readily to sound example from the ap-
55. For recognition of the seriousness of these problems and recapitulation of
provisions in the states for the assignment of judges and the collection of statis-
tics, see Vanderbilt ed., op. cit. supra note 16, at 29-87; AmERICAN BAR ASSocIA-
TION, op. cit. ,'ztpra note 36, at 21-36.
56. Elliott, Judicial Administration, 31 N.Y.U.L. REV. 162, 175 (1956). In
addition Puerto Rico has such an office; New York and Ohio also have offices of
this type but theirs are limited in the scope of operation and effectiveness.
57. 11 CouNcIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, BOOK OF THE STATES 1956-1957, at
206 (1956). In addition, in six states the chief justice of the court of last resort
is the judge having the shortest term to serve.
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pellate court establishing the same court hours for itself as for the
trial judges and rigidly living up to the rule.
The second great cause of undue delay is not getting cases on for
trial after the pleadings have been filed and various pretrial pro-
cedures have been completed. The extent of this type of delay is truly
alarming. According to figures published at the end of June 1955
by the Institute of Judicial Administration, while the average nation-
wide time interval from the date at which a case is at issue to the
trial of a jury case is 11.4 months--a time nearly twice as long as
it should be-a jury case has to wait for trial the preposterous period
of 46 months in Worcester County, Massachusetts, 44 months in
Queens County, New York, and 40 months in Cook County, Illinois
(Chicago), to mention the three worst offenders. In nine other courts
the delay for jury cases is 25 months or more. In some courts the
arrearages have been substantially reduced; thus the Circuit Court
of Jackson County, Missouri (Kansas City) has been one of those
making remarkable progress within a single year by shortening this
period from 24 to 14 months. 8
There is no reason why a citizen should have to wait more than six
months between the time when a case comes to issue and a trial and
decision of the dispute. Such a period allows time for prepara-
tion of the pleadings, preparation for trial, full discovery of the facts
before trial, and thorough preparation on the law by counsel. Any
period longer than that invites the utilization of administrative and
other nonjudicial procedures for the decision of disputes. The failure
to give a prompt and efficient trial in the plethora of automobile negli-
gence cases which today crowd the court calendars is particularly
dangerous. Laymen cannot be expected to continue to put up with
this state of things which is so costly to both litigants. Procrasti-
nation in needed reforms may result in depriving the courts of their
jurisdiction in such cases and handing it over to administrative tri-
bunals as was done with industrial accidents a half-century ago.'
Such proposals have been discussed for years, but lately with in-
creasing emphasis largely as a result of the law's delays. Such justice
is admittedly rough justice, but it is better than no justice at all.
58. STATE TRiAL COURTS OF GENERAL JURISDICTION, CALENDAR STATUS STUDY(1955). It is reported that most "of the courts in which trial delays are longest
are in the great metropolitan centers, but this is not true of all of them.... And
some metropolitan areas ... have reasonably short average delays for jury trial
cases ... " Id. at 4.
59. This is not a new suggestion, see Clark, Summary and Discussion of the
"Columbia Plan," 8 VA. L. WEEKLY DICTA COMP. No. 13 (1955); Marx Com-
pulsory Insurnwe Legislation Advocated, 8 id., No. 16 (1956). See also hEhren-
zweig, Auto Negligence: Is It an Anachronism, 8 id., No. 14 (1956) ; Greogory,
A General Summary of Automobile Negligence, 8 id., No. 3 (1955); hichardson,
Horse and Buggy Law in the Automobile Age, 8 id., No. 8 (1955). And see
articles cited in Conard, Workmen's Compensation: Is It More Efficient Than
Employer's Liability? 38 A.B.A.J. 1011, 1012 n.14 (1952).
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Before turning automobile accident cases over to an administrative
tribunal, would it not seem wise to investigate the wor1men's com-
pensation commissions to see how well they are really working?60
60. As to the need for inquiry into these matters, see Conard, supra note 59;
Kossoris, Workmen's Compensation in the United States, 76 MONTHLY LAB. REV.
359 (1953); Symposium: The Current Status of Workmen's Compensation, 7 IND.
& LAB. RFL. REV. 31 (1953). Conard, supra at 1013-14, 1058-59, reports on the
findings contained in CONRAD & MEHR, COSTS OF ADMINISTERING REPARATION FOR
WORK ACCIDENTS IN ILLINOIS (1952), which while admittedly merely a pilot study
indicates that a worlen's compensation system does not automatically bring
about a reduction in operating expenses and suggests the need for further studies
of the results of such administrative procedures to determine the extent of their
claimed efficiency. The Conard and Mehr Illinois study indicated that under the
FELA system about one-fifth of the total cost was operating expense while under
the workmen's compensation system about one-third of the total cost was operating
expense. See id. at 1, 54. For interesting statistics as to distribution of costs
under w orkwen's compensation, see id. at :30-34; and for sources of such expenses,
id. at 37-41. From this study and the statement that "perhaps the most amazing
thing about this huge public program [workmen's compensation], costing over$1,250,0,00,000 a year, is that so little is known about it; even the basic statistics
are lacking. . .'." (H. & A. Somers, Workmen's Compensation: Unfulfilled
I'romiscs, 7 IND. & LAB. REL. Rm. 32, 41-42 (1953)), it is obvious that research in
this field is necessary before an intelligent evaluation can be made.
It is interesting to note, however, that in one state, New Jersey, the Workmen's
Compensation Division of the Department of Labor, has 14 deputy directors who
preside at formal hearings, 41,2 formal referees hearing cases and pretrials, and
3 informal referees sitting on uncontested cases, or a total of 211/ officials hearing
claims. By way of comparison the superior, county, and district courts of the
entire state (the courts of original jurisdiction), are staffed by 103 judges.
For furthor observations on the operation of the workmen's compensation sys-
tems, see Somers, supra at 39, discussing the failure of workmen's compensation
legislation to achieve one of its major objectives:
iT]he removal of disputes from the legal cockpit to simple administrativedecisions based on the presumption of the right of the injured worker to be
compensated irrespective of fault. . . . It is now estimated that over 100,000
compensation cases are litigated a year. The President's Commission on the
Health Neds of the Nation . . . said recently "Excessive litigation is com-
mon, with both legal and medical chicanery."
The authors further note inter alia:
The hope and anticipation that litigation could be removed from the system
as presently constituted has gradually diminished. Even labor, which was
originally vastly suspicious of the lawyers, has come to feel that, workmen's
compensation being what it is, the assistance of counsel is needed.
Id. at 40. The inadequacy of the benefits under workmen's compensation is dis-
cussed U?. at 34-36, 40-41. See also Black, The Anomalies of Workmen's Com-
pens tii,,, 7 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 43 (1953), which after detailing the achieve-
ments of the system records that "a leading issue among the 'administrative'
problems is that of mounting litigation." Id. at 44.
As to the inadequacy of benefits under worlmien's compensation, see Pollack, A
Policy Deision for Workinen's Compemation, 7 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 51 (1953).
The author poses an important issue for those who argue for turning automobile
accident cases over to administrative tribunals: "The widespread failure to pro-
vide adequate benefits coextensive with disability or dependency is at least in part
due to a question that has arisen as to the feasibility of providing assured and
generous compensation." Id. at 57. The author also has these pertinent remarks
to make as to the administration of these laws:[I] n only ten jurisdictions are benefits initially adjudicated by the adminis-
tering agency or court. In the remaining thirty-nine states, claims are settled
mainly by agreement between the parties, a procedure that is often to the
disadvantage of the claimant. . . .With the limitation or shrinkage of gov-
ernment supervision, the procedure has become increasingly litigious, reviv-
inv the adversary roles of employer and employee, without the compensating
advantages of court litigation for damages... .[T]he total costs of litigation
and insurance are reaching unthinkable proportions.
Id. at 58-59.
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Even more to the point, the obvious remedy, which it has been demon-
strated in more places than one can be achieved, is to bring the work
of the courts up to date. Parenthetically let me note that at least one
great gain that has come from all this discussion is a very real interest
in the abolition of the harsh rule of contributory negligence and the
substitution of the more just rule of comparative negligence.01 The
acceptance of this doctrine will not only promote justice, but will do
much to bring about settlements in this type of litigation.
We have already seen that by giving the chief justice the power to
assign the judges where they are most needed and to the kind of work
that they are best fitted to perform, the effective performance of the
judiciary can be improved to a marked degree. The next step, which
violates, of course, the Jacksonian ideals but is of great importance
for efficiency, is the appointment by the chief justice of a presiding
judge in each county. The presiding judge in the larger counties must
be an expert in calendar control. We have had instances of a single
firm of trial lawyers having several hundred cases on the docket; the
answer we found was to have the presiding judge set up a special
trial list for the firm until its cases were disposed of. They will dis-
appear far more rapidly than they possibly would if left on the regular
calendar. A case tried without a jury takes about half the time of
one tried with a jury. Very well, then, encourage the waiver of juries
by giving a preference in the day's call to those civil cases where the
parties are willing to waive a jury.
Of all the devices in civil cases for saving time at the trial level
none is so valuable, and yet none so widely misunderstood, as the pre-
trial conference. 62 It is not a means of forcing settlements; a judge
who attempts to force a settlement should be censured. On the con-
trary, the pretrial conference really may be considered as a return
to informal oral pleading. It is a planned effort to get the lawyers on
each side to come to grips with their case before it comes on for trial.
After the lawyers have conferred privately concerning the issues of
law and of fact, they appear before the judge at a designated hour in
open court-for obvious reasons it is essential that pretrial confer-
ences be held in open court. The judge looks over the pleadings and
61. For suggestions of how to accelerate the work of the courts by trying
"such cases without juries under the rule of comparative negligence," see Peck,
The Law's Delay-What Insurance Companies Can Do About It, 1956 INS. L.J. 7,
8-10; Peck, System of Jury Trial Cause of Court Delay, 8 VA. L. WEEKLY DICTA
CoMP. No. 15 (1956). See also for summary of the acceptance of the doctrine of
comparative negligence and a selected bibliography, INSTITUTE Op JUDICIAL AD-
MINISTRATION, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (1955).
62. Early experiments with the pretrial conference in Detroit and Boston led
to the initiation of such procedure. FED. R. Cirv. P. 16, authorizing such confer-
ences gave a marked impetus to the adoption of this device. See Laws, Pretrial
Procedure-A Modern Method of Improving Trials of Law Suits, 25 N.Y.U.L.Q.
REV. 16 (1950).
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calls first on the plaintiff's lawyer and then the defendant's lawyer
to outline what they intend to prove. In this conference with counsel
he quickly shakes the nonessentials out of the pleadings and proceeds
to state the issues in their simplest form. Then he comes to the proofs
and discusses with counsel what documents are to be offered in evi-
dence; ordinarily they are produced then and there and marked in
evidence so that they will be ready for presentation at the trial with-
out calling attesting witnesses. Many facts likewise may be stipulated,
such as the ownership of the automobile in question and the agency
of the driver, and the amount of damages to the car, if the main issue
is liability or the extent of personal injuries. Out of this process of
consultation emerges a pretrial order which defines the issues, makes
any necessary amendments to the pleadings and states the admissions
of each side. It is dictated in open court and signed by the judge and
the law ers.-I
What are the results of the pretrial conference? Very often for the
first time the lawyers see the case, including their own side of it, in
its true perspective. Very often it becomes apparent to them that the
case has a settlement value, and in the two weeks intervening between
the pretrial conference and the date fixed for trial three cases out of
four are settled by the voluntary act of the parties without any inter-
ference from the court.
But settlements are by no means the most important aspect of the
pretrial conference nor is the fact that they shorten the trial of cases
by a third to a half. The great thing about pretrial conferences is
that the judge can try the case infinitely better than he could without
the pretrial conference order before him. He knows exactly what the
case is about from the beginning. If it involves some unfamiliar
proposition of law he can order that briefs be submitted in advance
of the trial so that he can know as much about the law of the case
as the lawyers do.
The last class of the law's delays is the failure of the trial judge
to dispose of a case immediately after he has read the trial briefs,
listened to the evidence, and heard the closing arguments of counsel.
If he has been alert throughout the trial he knows more about the case
then than he ever will again. Every day's delay will dim his memory
of the case by reason of his concentration meantime on other cases.
Delay thus means double or triple work for the judge and he should
resist at all hazards the pleas of counsel to fie briefs at a later date.
In bygone years in New Jersey delays of two or three years in deciding
cases were quite common, and delays of ten or twelve years or longer
63. See generally Nnis, PRE-TRIAL (1950); Crawford, Legal Problems of the
Pretrial Conference, 31 CORNELL L.Q. 285 (1946) ; and bibliography in INSTrruTE
OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, PRETRIAL RULES (1953).
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were not unheard of. In contrast, on January 1st last there were only
three cases in the entire state in which there were decisions outstand-
ing over four weeks from the completion of the trial, and in each
case there was a sound reason for withholding the opinion.
As a result of the application of these relatively simple ideas, the
problem of chronic calendar congestion was solved in New Jersey
and cases were better tried. In the first year under our new consti-
tution the number of cases disposed of was increased ninety-eight per
cent over the preceding year and the next year twenty per cent beyond
that figure. Despite increases in the number of cases being started, at
the end of the third year the number of cases on the calendar was the
smallest in twenty years.6 4
(4b) Another popular grievance against the courts is the failure
in too many civil cases to get a decision on the merits. All too often
the tendency is for a trial to become a battle between opposing counsel
rather than an orderly, rational search for the truth on the merits of
the controversy. As Judge Learned Hand has put it,
[It may be] hard to expect lawyers who are half litigants to
forego the advantages which come from obscuring the cases....
It is important, nevertheless, that we should realize the price we
pay for it, the atmospheres of contention over trifles, the unwill-
ingness to concede what ought to be conceded, and to proceed to
the things which matter. Courts have fallen out of repute; many
of you avoid them whenever you can, and rightly. About trials
hangs a suspicion of trickery, and a sense of a result depending
upon cajolery or worse.65
The normal citizen has an instinctive dislike of the disposition of
cases on technicalities of procedure. He believes naturally that every
case should be decided on its merits. In a book written some years
ago, Dean Stone, later Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, stated that sixty per cent of the cases decided in New York
were disposed of on procedural grounds. 6 I am sure that this high per-
centage does not still prevail in New York, but wherever there is a
legislative code of procedure, decisions on technicalities are inescap-
able, because the judges must respect the code which by reason of its
embodiment in statutory form is inflexible in its command. The ob-
vious answer to such a situation which serves to bring disgrace on the
law is to authorize the highest court in the state to-formulate simple,
flexible rules of procedure.6 7 The most important rule of procedure
is one which we have had in New Jersey for over a hundred years:
64. For details and summary of disposition of litigation in New Jersey, see
AL INISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS NEW JERSEY, ANNUAL REPORTS.
65. Hand, The Deficiencies of Tarics to Reach the Heart, of the Matter, in 3
N.Y. CITY BAR Ass'N, LECTURES ON LEGAL Topics 88, 104-05 (1926).
66. STONE, LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 120 (1915).
67. For appropriate recommendation of the Am. Bar Ass'n on this point and
considerations of the status of the rule-maldng power in the various states and its
exercise, see Vanderbilt ed., op. cit. supra note 16, at 91-146; AMERICAN BAn
ASSoCATION , op. cit. supra note 36, at 10-21.
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The rules of this court shall be considered as general rules for
the government of the court and the conducting of causes; and
as the design of them is to facilitate business and advance justice,
they may be relaxed or dispensed with by the court in any cases
where it shall be manifest to the court that a strict adherence to
them will work surprise or injustice.1s
The reasons why any state retains a legislatively enacted code of
procedure do no credit to its bench and bar, for they can only stem
from unwillingness to learn and use a simplified system of -procedure
making for decisions on the merits of each controversy. Unfor-
tunately, what Elihu Root said over fifty years ago still is true of too
great a proportion of the legal profession. In 1904 he wrote:
[W]e conduct and try our cases too much as if we were playing
a game, in which the Judge was umpire to award a prize to the
most skillful player . . . delay in itself creates litigation and
creates more delay; that the true way to improve conditions is not
by making more judges and still more judges, but [is] to create a
sentiment at the Bar and on the Bench which will discourage our
vexatious methods; and I pleaded guilty myself to all the faults
which I was pointing out.... [D] ilatory tactics are not exactly in
favor, yet they are not considered discreditable, and we all get to
dawdling and postponing and forgetting the merits of the cause
in the intricacies of the practice.3
Whenever changes in procedure have been proposed, they have
met with professional opposition because of the bar's uncritical ac-
ceptance of things as they are, and unwillingness to change and learn
new ways.- The opposition to the Field Code, in its day a vast im-
provement over common law procedure, exemplifies this. Today's
modern court-made rules have met with similar opposition in spite of
the effective way they have worked in the federal courts and in those
states where they have been adopted. Wherever such rules of pro-
cedure have been used, they have given satisfaction. These court-
made rules of procedure should never be regarded as definitive. And
this itself is difficult for the profession to accept. No system of pro-
cedure can ever be considered perfect. As new needs and abuses de-
velop, procedural provisions must be elastic and subject to continual
revision if they are to be useful and not to become rigid and an end
68. N.J. CT. ERR. & APP. RULE 45, originally adopted Oct. 24, 1845; see 3
MINUTES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 36; for present rule (R.R. 1:27A) see 1 NEW
JERSEY PRACTICE 59 (Supp. 1955). See also former rule 1 id. at 14 (R.R. 1:1-8).
69. 1 JESSUP, ELIHU ROOT 434-35 (1938).
70. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, as quoted in Gardner, The Machinery of Law
Reform in England, 69 L.Q. REV. 46, 54-55 (1953), has said:
[N]othing is more true of my profession than that the most eminent among
them, for 100 years, have testified with complete confidence that something.
is impossible which, once it is introduced, is found to be very easy of admin-
istration.... Every effort to effect improving changes is resisted on the
assumption that man's ultimate wisdom is to be found in the legal system at
the date at which you try to make a change.
See also Fowler, A Psychological Approach to Procedural Reform, 43 YALE L.J.
1254, 1265-66 (1934).
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in themselves. Procedural rules must be revised as experience dictates,
with the aid of the bench and representatives of the bar in judicial
conferences.
(4c) Closely related to the evil of procedural technicalities is the de-
cision of a case through surprise. This can be obviated in large meas-
ure by the adoption of the modern civil rules patterned on those used
in the federal courts freely permitting interrogatories, depositions in
aid of discovery, and inspections and demands for admissions.7'
Discovery is useful not only to narrow the issues, but also to obtain
evidence for use at the trial and information as to the whereabouts or
existence of such evidence. Prior to the Federal Rules, English and
Canadian experience as well as that of several of the states had dem-
onstrated the advantages in trial practice of a preliminary examina-
tion of the evidence of both parties. 72 The value of the Federal Rules
is to be found in the frequency of their use. The purpose of liberal
rules of discovery is to enable each party to prepare to meet the evi-
dence against him and to eliminate as far as is possible being taken by
surprise. 73 The scope of discovery is limited only by the requirement
that it deal with matters relevant to the pending action, and that it not
inquire into privileged matters or without adequate reasons pry into
the "privacy of an attorney's course of preparation."174 I know that
complaint has been made that the deposition process has been abused
in some courts, 75 but it will not be if the profession and judiciary are
alert. However, at almost every bar association meeting and confer-
ence of judges that I have attended in New Jersey in the last eight
years I have asked that counsel and the judges let me know of any such
case of abuse, and after eight years not a single complaint has been
registered with me. The cure for any such abuse, if it occurs, is en-
tirely within the control of the bar in the first instance and of the trial
judge ultimately. With proper rules of procedure and with adequate
opportunity for the free exercise of pretrial procedure, technicalities
and surprise may be practically eliminated and a trial may become an
orderly proceeding for the discovery of truth in the interest of justice.
We have already commented on the evils of the Jacksonian demo-
cratic trial methods. In over half the states in the Union the trial
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37. See Speck, The Use of Discovery in the United
States Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 1133 (1951); Note, Discovery Practice in States
Adopting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 68 HARv. L. REV. 673 (1955).
72. See generally RAGLAND, DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL (1932).
73. See Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery Under Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 41 MIcH. L. REV. 205 (1942); Wright, Wegner, & Richardson, The
Practicing Attorney's View of the Utility of Discovery, 12 F.R.D. 97 (1952).
74. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511-12 (1947).
75. For enumeration and discussion of some complaints, see Speck, supra note
71, at 1143, 1152; Note, 36 MINN. L. REV. 364, 376 (1952); The Practical Opera-
tion of Federal Discovery-A Symposium on the Use of Depositions and Dis.
covery under the Federal Rules, 12 F.R.D. 131, 142-45 (1952).
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judges are still not allowed to comment on the evidence, not permitted
to ask questions even though neither counsel has brought out a perti-
nent fact, and not permitted to sum up a case to the jury clearly in his
own language. Where these rules prevail, a fair trial is an obvious im-
possibility. In some states instructions to the jury have become so
complicated as to be beyond the power of the trial judges to cope with
them, resulting in frequent reversals. The remedy is obvious: give
back to the trial judge the powers that he had at common law and
which he still exercises in the federal courts and a considerable num-
ber of others. This is the only way that frequent reversals from this
cause can be avoided.
(5) Thus far we have dealt only with trial procedure, but our prac-
tices on appeal likewise leave much to be desired. I am not referring
to those outmoded technicalities of the bygone era such as assignments
of error, bills of exception, grounds of appeal, petitions of appeal, spec-
ification of causes for reversal, and writs of error,76 which are mere
excess baggage that can be thrown overboard at will when the bench
and bar wake up. Rather am I concerned with the surprising number
of appeals that are submitted on briefs alone without oral argument.
Without oral argument how can the essentials of the issues be laid
bare? How can lawyers or litigants be sure the bench understands the
points at conflict? How can the judiciary resolve their doubts and
questions arising out of the arguments set forth in the briefs? In only
two states is oral argument required in all appellate cases.77 Sub-
mission of appeals on briefs is beyond the comprehension of an Eng-
lish judge. "How," asked Judge Russell of Killowen of the House of
Lords, "can you know that the judges actually read the record and the
briefs?" Lord Chancellor Jowitt was equally frank, "No one would
ever dream that if they left it to us to read it we would ever do so. ' '7 3
The arguments in English appellate courts are usually lengthy, but by
the time the argument is over everyone can tell who is going to win the
appeal and generally on what ground. Inevitably such a process pro-
duces respect for judicial decisions.
There is nothing in the field of law quite as futile as an appellate
court solemnly listening to the arguments of counsel without having
read and analyzed the briefs that counsel have gone--or should have
gone--to great pains to prepare and on which they inevitably rely in
making their oral arguments. Even assuming that the judges know all
the law-a theory concededly contrary to fact-they certainly do not
know the facts of the case to be decided. Not only should every mem-
76. For the common-law practice as to writs of error, see 3 BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES "406-11; SHIPOAN, COMMON-LAW PLEADING § 91 (2d ed. 1895).
For one state's elimination of this antique provision, see N.J. SuP. CT. RumF
1:2-9. See also Vanderbilt ed., op. cit. supra note 16, at 401-06, 411-15.
17 See Vanderbilt ed., op. ct. note 16, at 437.
78. Address, N.Y.U. Law Center dinner, Sept. 26, 1947.
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ber. of the court read the briefs in advance of oral argument and pre-
pare a typewritten memorandum of his tentative views, but it is also
very helpful for the court to indicate to counsel at the outset. of the
argument which points most concern the court, leaving it to counsel, of
course, to employ their time as they see fit. After hearing the argu-
ments of counsel and particularly after listening to their answers to
any questions which have been troubling us, we often find ourselves
changing the views we had tentatively reached on the initial reading of
the briefs. Many lawyers argue better than they write. If this is so, I
am sometimes asked, why read the briefs before the arguments?
There are several reasons: if you read the briefs in advance of the ar-
guments, you will know what points the briefs leave unanswered in
your mind, and you can ask questions concerning them at the oral argu-
ment. If you read the briefs only after the argument and questions
arise in your mind, counsel will not be available for answering the
questions you would like to ask him. Reading the briefs in advance,
moreover, saves the court from interrupting counsel and asking ques-
tions that need not have been asked if it had read the briefs. Argu-
ments to an informed court move faster than arguments to an unin-
formed court, particularly if any of the judges are talkative or dispu-
tatious. Furthermore, if counsel know that the court has studied the
briefs, the temptation to stray from the facts or to color the law is
removed; the penalty of exposure at the oral argument is something
most counsel do not wish to endure. Finally, the volume of decisions
in each state is so vast that no judge can possibly know all the cases;
it is a great advantage to the judges therefore to get a general view
of the law of the case before listening to the several parts of the
argument.
Even more vicious than appeals submitted on briefs or appeals
heard by courts 'which have not read the briefs are "one man" deci-
sions on appeal. Yet in over half of our appellate courts cases are as-
signed to the judges for opinion writing in regular sequence before the
argument or any discussion in conference. How in these circum-
stances, to paraphrase Lord Russell, does one ever know whether all
the judges have read the briefs or listened to the arguments? The sys-
tem reaches the height of absurdity in two states where the justice to
whom a case is assigned may write not only the majority opinion but
one of his own in dissent.79
When I think of the time and energy that has been devoted over the
years to the study of opinions, I wonder that more time has not been
devoted to a study of the rationality and the effectiveness of the
methods by which those opinions have been reached.
79. Vanderbilt ed., op. cit. supra note 16, at 440.
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III
Important as the administration of civil justice seems to private liti-
gants, it can readily be demonstrated that the administration of crim-
inal justice in any country is a far more important matter to both the
state and the individual citizens. A nation that cannot maintain peace
and order within its boundaries will not be able long to withstand its
enemies from without the country. Inevitably it will perish. But not-
withstanding the clear logic of the situation, popular concern over the
courts centers not in the criminal law but in the administration of civil
justice. Not only is this so among the people, but likewise in the law
schools there is much more concern over civil remedies-the justice, if
you please, of our business civilization-than there is in the enforce-
ment of the criminal law. This is doubly unfortunate, because on the
civil side the courts have it within their power, if they will but exert
themselves, to carry out their responsibilities unaided by other depart-
ments of government, but in the administration of criminal justice the
courts are largely dependent on the action of officials in the executive
branch of government to detect, apprehend, and prosecute criminals.
Whatever the deficiencies of the courts, they are in general far less in-
volved in politics than the executive or legislative branches. And it
must always be remembered in this connection that not only are the
problems of criminal contests much more complicated in an age of
science, but the social conscience of the times demands much more of
the criminal law than it did fifty or a hundred years ago. Obviously
the courts need more help in the criminal field than in the civil. But
regrettably the bar is even less interested in criminal law than in civil
law and lawyers practicing criminal law are least interested of all in
improving it. Their professional interest all too often is in helping
rascals escape the clutches of the law.
(1) In dealing with the administration of the criminal law it will
doubtless surprise you that I shall speak first of what I regard as the
most important court in any state-the local or municipal court-a
court, however, to which most people and likewise most lawyers give
very little attention, though the public has, perhaps unconsciously, ex-
pressed its opinion by rating the judges of such courts four per cent
lower in honesty than the judges of the state courts and fourteen per
cent lower than the judges of the federal courtsso The reason for
popular lack of faith in these courts does not require a lengthy search;
it is in the local criminal courts that most citizens have their only con-
tact with the courts and the impressions they form are often unfavor-
able. There was a time when the justice of the peace was merely a
local jiidge dealing with cases of disorderly conduct or holding over
80. See note 23 supra.
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offenders for the grand jury. The advent of the automobile8i worked a
revolution in this and the other local, so-called "inferior" courts. No
longer are they frequented exclusively by the local flotsam and jetsam
of society; people of every rank, young and old alike, are haled there.
Traditionally the justice of the peace has been paid by fees-fees paid
by the defendant.8 2 If the defendant were to win, the justice would get
no fee. This is a situation which inevitably tends to produce tension
in the judicial breast, if justice pure and undefiled is the objective.
Especially is tension apparent when the defendant is a motorist from
out of town or, worse yet for him, from out of the state. Not that
there are not honest justices of the peace, but for many, the oppor-
tunities are indeed alluring.
This situation led to that opprobrious American custom known as
the fix-the illegal suppression of traffic tickets.83 While traffic of-
fenders are generally otherwise law abiding citizens, the amazing fact
is that the temptation to "fix" traffic tickets is seemingly irresistible
for many who would condemn the fixing of a judge or jury in an ordi-
nary case, and they succumb to the temptation without compunction.
The fix is a nationwide custom84 except in a relatively few places. The
extent of its use may be easily shown. In the largest city in New
Jersey, after adequate means were instituted to eliminate the fix, there
were in the first quarter of the year only 607 tickets that were not an-
swered in court as compared with 14,529 tickets in the corresponding
quarter of the preceding year under the old order.85
What are the means by which the fixing of tickets is eliminated?
Simply the use of a uniform nonfixable traffic violations ticket, which
the police officer makes out in quadruplicate with the aid of carbon
paper, the original going to the traffic court, one copy to police head-
quarters, one retained by the police officer who handed it out, and one
to the offender.86 The tickets are all numbered and every ticket issued
to an officer must be accounted for. All of this means that this kind
of a ticket cannot be fixed without the active cooperation of three
public officials-the judge, the police chief, and the issuing officer. An
attempt to interfere with a ticket constitutes a contempt of court. In
81. See WARREN, TRAFFIC COURTS (1942); Vanderbilt ed., op. cit. supra note
16, at 263-67, 275-92; Economos, Traffic Courts and Justice of the Peace Courts,
25 N.Y.U.L. Ruv. 66 (1950).
82. For details of survival of the system of fee-paid justices, see WARREN,
op. cit. supra note 81, at 202-03, 211-22; Smith, The Justice of the PeaceSystem, 15 CALIF. L. Rav. 118, 120-21 (1927). See also Vanderbilt ed., op. cit.
supra note 16, at 306-16; Sunderland, A Study of Justices of the Peace and Other
Minor Courts, 15 MICH. JUDICIAL COUNCIL REP. 57, 106-09 (1945); and opinion
of Chief Justice Taft in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
83. Vanderbilt ed., op. cit. supra note 16, at 300-02.
84. For results of recent investigation indicating extensive ticket fixing in
Suffolk County, New York, see N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1956, p. 1, col. 1.
85. Director of Public Safety, Newark, Report (1949).
86. See Vanderbilt ed., op. cit. supra note 16, at 292-93.
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these circumstances, after weighing the slim chances of success
against the very real dangers of failure, offenders wisely conclude
that it is not worth their while to run the risk. Last year the non-
fixable ticket resulted in one person out of five in New Jersey paying
his respects to the traffic courts in over a million cases with fines
aggregating over $6,500,000.67 The state has the third lowest accident
rate per mile in the country, notwithstanding its heavily travelled
interstate arteries of traffic. We would not be so brash as to suggest
that it is solely because of this fine record of the municipal courts for
law enforcement that New Jersey is the third lowest state in the Union
in the number of fatalities per miles traveled, but we do venture to
assert that without this type of law enforcement New Jersey could
never have achieved its present high standing. One has but to con-
sider the number of defendants who appear in the traffic courts and
to estimate the number of witnesses in addition thereto in order to
appreciate the unique opportunity of tr-affic judges to increase-or
decrease-the average citizen's respect for law.
One would imagine that such a ticket would be used in every state
of the Union. In spite of the success of the uniform nonfixable traffic
ticket in New Jersey for some years, it has not been adopted through-
out any other state, though it has found acceptance in various parts
of several states. Is it unreasonable to suspect that politics may ex-
plain why such a simple efficacious remedy has not found uniform
acceptance? Both the Conference of Chief Justices and the Confer-
ence of Governors unanimously approved the nonfixable ticket in 1952.
If we are at all concerned either about the conservation of human life
against a killer which has been demonstrated statistically to be more
dangerous than war itself,", or with respect for law, which cannot
exist without respect for the courts, this problem should arouse us to
action. If traffic courts and the police can be fixed, the citizen is en-
titled to wonder if all other judges and all other officials are not
susceptible.
Traffic court business is big business. The overall dollar cost, in-
cluding property destroyed, loss of wages or value of services in the
cases of temporary disability, and the present value of anticipated
87. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, NEW JERSEY, REPORT 1954-55,
Tables AA, BB.
88. In December, 1951, the United States had its 1,000,000th death by auto-
mobile as compared with 467,711 soldiers killed in battle from the Revolutionary
War through 'World War II. INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 232 (Kieran ed.
1952). In 11950 alone, there were some 8,500,000 automobile accidents in the
United States which caused the death of 35,000 persons, injuries to 1,200,000
more-100,000 permanently-and caused property damage amounting to $7,500,
000. The National Safety Council has estimated that 1950's traffic accidents cost
this nation a total of $3,100,000,000. Address by Pyke Johnson, President of
the Automotive Safety Foundation, Annual Congress of the American Public
Works Association at Detroit, Sept. 19, 1951.
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future earnings in case of total permanent disability or death and
medical expenses, totals upwards of four billion dollars a year. For-
getting for the moment the loss of human life and the human suffer-
ing that traffic accidents' cause, and thinking only of respect for law
in an age when respect for law is -needed as it has never before been
needed in the world's history, can there be any doubt that ticket-
fixing in the traffic courts and easy sentences or no sentences at all
for traffic offenders, are breaking down respect for law throughout
the country in a way that all of the other courts in the land cannot
possibly hope to offset? If the average citizen finds corruption in or
about the traffic court, which 'is the court he is most likely to know
out of his own experience, what reason is there for his thinking that
the other courts in the state are more honest? In 1950 there were at
least fifteen million defendants haled into traffic courts throughout the
country.8 9 In addition thereto, nobody can tell us how many witnesses
were summoned or how many tickets were fixed so that the defendants
never had to go to court. Compared with this multitude, the number
of people who appear in the ordinary civil and criminal courts is in-
deed small and the number who appear in our appellate courts alto-
gether negligible. The Conference of Chief Justices and the Confer-
ence of Governors studied the situation and in 1952 adopted sixteen
resolutions designed to ameliorate the situation,0 but they have
found little acceptance in the several states. Are not these problems
such as should be brought to the attention of every law student? He
will inevitably have contact with them early in his practice either in
the criminal courts or in negligence work or in administering the
estates of the victims.
(2) When we turn from such a seemingly simple matter as traffic
law enforcement to crime in general, we find ourselves confronted
with a host of problems, the existence of which the profession dare
not remain ignorant if society is going to be a safe place in which to
live and carry on business. In 1919 Charles Evans Hughes portrayed
conditions in the police courts.:
. I never speak of this work of our higher courts without the
reflection that after all it is the courts of minor jurisdiction which
count the most so far as respect for the institutions of justice is
concerned .... If our Bar Associations could create a sentiment
which would demand that in all our cities the police and minor
civil courts should fairly represent the Republic as the embddi-
ment of the spirit of justice, our problem of Americanization
would be more than half solved. A petty tyrant in a police court,
refusals of a fair hearing in minor civil courts, the impatient dis-
- 89. MODERzN PRoCEDURs AND JUDICIL ADmINISTRATION 1237 n.1 (Vanderbilt
ed. 1952). . , .
. 90. Resolutions Set Standard for Traffic Court Improvement, 35 J. AM. Jim.
Soc'y 133 (1952).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss3/1
IMPASSES IN JUSTICE
regard of an immigrant's ignorance of our ways and language,
will daily breed Bolshevists who are beyond the reach of your
appeals. Here is work for lawyers. The Supreme Court of the
United States and the Court of Appeals will take care of them-
selves. Look after the courts of the poor, who stand most in need
of justice. The security of the Republic will be found in the
treatment of the poor and the ignorant; in indifference to their
misery and helplessness lies disaster.1
Is there any evidence that these conditions have changed for the
better in the last forty years? Should not every law school in con-
nection with its traditional course in criminal law enlighten its stu-
dents as to the basic facts of the extent of crime in the United States,
of the efforts which are being made to overcome it, and the current
methods for the treatment of criminal offenders? According to the
report of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in the
first half of 1955 there were an estimated 1,128,350 major crimes in
the United States, although the year 1955 marked a break in the pre-
vious seven years of upward trends.- I am not advocating any de-
tailed study of crime control, for I realize full well the preciousness
of time in the law school curriculum, but surely we cannot continue
to teach criminal law in a vacuum. The report of the Kefauver Com-
mittee has brought out in startling form the connection between
crime, graft, and government.3 There is no reason to suspect that the
era it portrays is a thing of the past; are the law schools doing their
proper job unless they present not only the facts of criminal behavior
but also study new methods of control such as permanent statewide
crime councils for controlling the situation? One of the encouraging
signs of the times is that the American Bar Foundation has under-
taken an adequately financed survey of criminal law enforcement
throughout the United States, which should be a source of very real
encouragement to the law schools to make this field their own.34
(3) Of late years we have been much concerned with juvenile de-
linquency. Juvenile courts under one name or another have been in-
creasing in number and in many places they are making enlightened
efforts to cope with the problem." But must it not be obvious even
in counties where such courts are instituted that the volume of work
91. The President's Address, 42 N.Y.S.B.A. REP. 224, 240 (1919).
9'2. 26 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 3 (1955).).:,, &-r KEFAUVER, CRIME IN AMERICA (1951).
94, See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
I t 1,im U NITED STATES, PLAN FOR A SURVEY (prepared by Sherry & Pettis 1955).
For preliminary work in this field, consideration of the Kefauver Committee testi-
mony and recommendation for state action, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COM-
MISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, ORGANIZED CRIME AND LAw ENFORCEMENT (PIos-
cowe ed. 1953) (2 vol.).
95, See INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, JUVENILE COURTS-JURISDIC-
TION (1954), for a summary and selected bibliography on juvenile courts. See also
INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF REPORTS AND
STUDIES, CHILDREN AND YOUTH LAWS (1954).
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is so great and that it varies so much in seriousness that the judge
cannot hope to attend to what are called minor cases of juvenile de-
linquency? And yet, who can tell what are minor cases and when,
if neglected, they will lead to more serious offenses? I have been much
impressed with an experiment in New Jersey with municipal juvenile
conference committees that first sprang up locally and informally at
the grass roots, and after success in a single county were extended
with official recognition on a statewide basis.0 6 These committees
are made up of public-spirited citizens drawn from various walks of
life and generally include the local magistrates, representatives of
the clergy and the school systems, businessmen, and leaders in
women's organizations. A representative of the county probation office
constitutes the liaison between the committee and the juvenile court.
The committee calls the delinquent and his parents before them and
patiently and systematically develops the facts. It acts only in in-
stances when the members are unanimous in their decision and there
is, of course, an appeal from any decision of the committee. Appeals,
however, are rare, the decisions of the committees generally satisfying
the common sense of the juvenile and his parents, as well as the in-
jured party. In a surprisingly large number of cases the self-respect
of the juvenile is awakened and a new start made toward good citizen-
ship. Should not plans of this sort be the subject of discussion in law
school?
(4) Our greatest concern with the oncoming generation, I submit,
relates to the perversion of young minds through the mass media
of the movies, television, radio, and the press, especially so-called
comics. 9 7 The problem is only beginning to receive the consideration
its seriousness calls for. Here is a field in which the law schools are
well equipped to furnish leadership in a controversy where rare dis-
crimination and courage are required.
(5) We are coming to increasingly understand that there is a
very definite connection in many instances between the children of
broken homes and juvenile delinquency and ultimately serious crime.
It has been estimated that in 1953 there were 1,546,000 marriages
and 390,000 divorces involving 300,000 children. In these circum-
stances, does the state not owe it to itself to make a serious effort
at reconciliation in the case of threatened divorce, particularly in
instances where minor children are involved? Such reconciliation
96. N.J. Sup. CT. RuLE 6:2-2 (adopted Jan. 1, 1953) governs. See ADMNISTRA-
TIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTs, NEW JERsEY, REPORT 1954-55, at 12: for discussion
of the operation of these committees, see Sixth Public Hearing Nefore the N. J.
Legislative Commission to Study Juvenile Delinquency, May 25, 1955.
97. WERTHAM, SEDUCTION OF THE INNOCENT (1954). See also FErn, CoMIC
BOOK REGULATION (Univ. of Calif. Bureau of Pub. Admin. 1955).
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proceedings have been tried with remarkable success in some states,98
notably California. Should not the law schools consider these possibil-
ities?
(6) No law school discussion on the problems of the criminal law
can be adequate without dwelling on the functions of probation and
parole as a means of individual rehabilitation of various types of of-
fenders. ' Indeed, the outlook would be dismal without them and yet
these and other similar social agencies raise fundamental constitu-
tional problems that may not be ignored. In their zeal to care for
children and to prevent repeated crime, neither judges nor welfare
workers can be permitted to violate the Constitution, especially the
constitutional provisions as to due process that are involved in moving
a child from its home. The indispensable elements of due process
are: first, a tribunal with jurisdiction; second, notice of a hearing
to the proper parties; and finally, a fair hearing. All three must
be present, if we are to treat the child as an individual human being
and are not to revert, in spite of good intentions, to the more primi-
tive days when he was treated as a chattel. Centuries before juvenile
courts, welfare workers or public schools, at a time in the develop-
ment of the law when children were still little more than property
and were spoken of in the law in terms of title and possession, the
Court of King's Bench developed its prerogative writs and extraordi-
nary remedies for the purpose of holding the subordinate courts and
the administrative officers and bodies of that day to their respective
orbits. Mandamus commanded them to do some prescribed ministe-
rial act; prohibition forbade them to proceed on matters beyond their
jurisdiction; certiorari, the most flexible of all these writs, was the
means of questioning the jurisdiction or action of any inferior
court or administrative body; and habeas corpus commanded the
production of the body of any person detained or imprisoned any-
where in the kingdom to inquire into the legality of the detention.
Every judge or child welfare worker would do well to ponder these
writs or their modern equivalents, for they are the indispensable
means whereby a free society remains free by preserving a rule of
law as distinguished from a government of men. They apply as much
to judges and welfare workers as to all other officials and citizens.
This is a phase of our jurisprudence which our law students should
know both as future lawyers and as citizens.
(7) Closely connected with these problems is the related field of
!98. See Chute, Divorce and the Family Court, 18 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 49,
58 (1950).
99. See generally UNITED NATIONS, DEP'T OF SocL AFFAIRS, PROBATION AND
RELATED MEASURES (1951).
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the rights of the mentally ill,100 a difficult topic calling for the best
thinking of our ablest legal scholars.
(8) Finally, we need to remember that it is in the realm of the
criminal law that the great constitutional issues involving civil rights
are likely to arise. And if our system of criminal law is not operating
effectively, as obviously it is not in most places, how can we hope for
the orderly enforcement of civil rights? No substantive rights,
not even the rights guaranteed by the Federal and state constitutions,
are really assured to one until he is vouchsafed the most fundamental
right of all-the right to a fair trial.
Of what real avail is a suit for the breach of a contract or a libel
action for injury to one's reputation, if the judge on the bench or
the jury in the box or one's attorney at the counsel table is either
incompetent or corrupt, or if the system of procedure under which
they attempt to function is dilatory and cumbersome, or excessively
expensive or unduly restrictive of the search for truth? Even today
after several centuries of development in the law, a fair trial is not
always assured in its entirety by our constitutions, statutes, rules of
court, decisions, and practice. As every lawyer knows, and as every
law student should quickly learn, the right to a fair trial is still
being developed in the courts. °101 More progress, to be sure, has
been-made in this vital matter in the last eighteen years than in the
entire preceding century, yet much remains to be secured. Every
lawyer has a definite professional stake in the orderly and complete
development of the right to a fair trial, just as every honest litigant
has a personal interest in it. Indeed, it is fundamental in our civili-
zation. On it, in the last analysis, depends general respect for law,
and without general respect for law our kind of government cannot
long survive. One of the most important aspects of the study of
procedure for the individual student, therefore, is to leaim to what
extent the right to a fair trial is protected by constitution, statutes,
rules of court, courf decisions, and practice in the jurisdiction in
which he intends to practice, and how much is yet to be achieved,
100. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DiSORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE (1954); GuTr-
MACHER -& WEIHOFEN, PsYCHIATRY AND THE LAW (1952). The enactment of the
Mental Health Study Act of 1955, 69 STAT. 381,42 U.S.C. § 242(b) (Supp. III,
1956), indicates the widespread awareness of the seriousness of the current
problem resulting from mental illness. For interesting discussion, see Insanity
and the Criminal Law--A Critique of Durham v. United States, 22 U. CHr. L.
REV. 317-404 (1955).1 101. Some may question whether there is such a general right as a right to a
fair trial, juit as lawyers ofran earlier day quedtioned whether there was a law
of contracts and not merely actions in debt, covenant, and assumpsit, or a law of
torts rather than a variety of actions ex delicto; cf. HOLMES, Law in Science and
Sdience in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERs 218-23 (1920).- 1 venture to prophesy
that the growing concept of the right to a fair trial will be one of the major
developments of the law in the twentieth century; see, e.g., the concurring opinion
of Jackson, J. in Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951).
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for on his admission to the bar he, too, will be charged with the duty
of perfecting it. It will doubtless come as a shock to many law stu-
dents to see how far short of fair standards the courts of their own
state fall, but the shock is essential to a realization of the challenge
that defective standards impose on them. As Sir Maurice Sheldon
Amos aptly puts it: "Procedure lies at the heart of the law."'102 It
is important for us to see clearly that it is only the rights that can
be adequately enforced in our civil and criminal courts which con-
stitute the sum of our actual freedom. Without such enforcement
our alleged rights become a snare and a delusion. In this connection
we shall do well to keep in mind the pointed warning of Mr. Justice
Brandeis that "in the development of our liberty insistence upon
procedural regularity has been a large factor.''1 °3
IV
To summarize, everyone must concede the failure in many states
of the administration of both civil and criminal justice to keep pace
with the needs of the times in many fundamental respects. It is
unthinkable that a proud profession should allow such a condition
to continue with respect to a branch of government which is their
peculiar concern and which affects the lives of the people at so many
points.
The administration of justice in this country has been peculiarly
affected as nowhere else in the common-law world by the democratic
notions of the Jacksonian Revolution, which still dominate the
methods of judicial selection, the procedural law, and the trial and
appellate methods in many states. In these circumstances it is futile
to look to our elective judges for leadership in far-reaching court
reforms, for they must look to the prevailing system for continuance
in office. Not only is the bar inclined to follow the judiciary in court
matters, but many lawyers who are interested in politics have a per-
sonal stake in the existing order. Few lawyers, moreover, have ever
made any systematic study on a comparative basis of the problems
of judicial administration-they have no interest to do so since the
large majority of them devote themselves exclusively to the office
practice of the law-and they therefore tend to regard the system of
procedure prevailing in their state as natural and inevitable, despite
the many contrasts to be seen in the federal courts sitting in their
own state. I do not eliminate the possibility of a movement led by
distinguished members of the bar as a possibility for law reform,
because there are states in which such movements seem to be stirring,
but they inevitably suffer from the lack of knowledge of lawyers
generally as to what it is all about.
102. A Day in Court at Home and Abroad, 2 CAMB. L.J. 340 (1926).
103. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 477 (1921).
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Court reform may also come as a last resort through popular re-
volt, but this may be as dangerous as were the reforms of the Jack-
sonian Era if adequate professional leadership for such a movement
does not emerge. If the bench and bar fail to put their house in order,
fail to keep the machinery of justice operating properly, and the
public loses patience, measures for reform may be adopted under
lay leadership which may only multiply the problems. And because
of their popular origin and their frequent incorporation in state con-
stitutions, such changes are particularly difficult to alter. The popular
election and limited terms of the judiciary, and the legislative codes
of procedure, and the failure to alter these despite the obvious and
admitted inadequacies and evils, are examples in point.
In any event, the law schools must prepare the leaders of tomorrow.
In teaching procedure they must change their approach. They must
no longer burden the subject with the ancient forms of action, but
consign them where they belong, to Contracts, Property, and Torts.
They must teach not only what is, but what ought to be. Procedure
should not be studied as something perfect and immutable, but rather
as a working system that, no matter how good it is, needs constantly
to be developed in competition with the best that has been achieved
elsewhere. The approach to the problems of procedure should be
comparative and critical. As students we should be as much concerned
with what the law should be as with what it is or has been. Going
further, it is the duty of the law schools to instruct their students in
the major problems of the administration of justice and to prepare
them to lead in the initiation and the acceptance of such reforms.
This is an obligation they owe to the courts, the profession, and the
public generally, if litigants are not, as Judge Learned Hand has
said, to "dread a law suit beyond almost anything short of sickness
and death."1 ° It is an obligation which can be fulfilled in a relatively
few semester hours. With adequate law school instruction, the
bench and bar may stimulate the necessary changes and discharge
their professional responsibility for the improvement of the law. The
law schools must make every effort to bring home to their students
the fact that the judicial system is not operating effectively and to
indicate the reforms which are necessary if the public is to be ex-
pected to continue to employ the judicial system. A critical approach
to these problems must be cultivated so that reform will be a contin-
uing process. If there were such a course in every law school, the
chaotic conditions and public dissatisfaction which characterize the
whole field of the administration of justice would not long continue to
exist.
I believe if the law schools interest themselves in improving the
104. Hand, supra note 65.
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administration of justice they will generally sense that in addition to
instruction at the undergraduate level they should conduct post-
graduate seminars in the basic principles of judicial administration
and modern procedure. Particularly do trial and appellate judges,
prosecutors, and leaders of the profession who have it in their power
to institute reforms need an opportunity to become educated in these
matters or it will take another generation to make up for the law
schools' shortcomings of the past.
Next, the law faculties themselves should supply leadership in
studies in the field of judicial administration. What makes the situa-
tion especially challenging is the relative simplicity of the task and
of the changes that are needed to make our judicial establishments
effective.
Where can the traditions of the bar be built up if not in the law
schools? We have no Inns of Court, where the barristers congregate
daily for lunch and where the benchers and their wives eat together on
Sundays after attending their own church. In this country we had
similar unifying influences in the earlier days of circuit-riding and of
foregathering at the state capitol at the opening of each term to
hear the opinions of the appellate court read and, possibly, to criticize
them at the tavern nearby. The benefits to the profession of such
contacts cannot be overestimated. They make possible traditions
that are handed down from generation to generation that affect the
daily lives of the bar far more than any formal canons of professional
conduct. The contacts of our modern lawyers, on the other hand,
are casual, and even where we have strong bar associations their
meetings are infrequent. I am not suggesting that the law schools
carry these burdens alone. They are entitled to the aid of the leaders
of every branch of the profession. I am saying that the law schools,
it seems clear, furnish the one intellectual meeting place that is avail-
able for mobilizing the constructive forces of the profession to
solve our great problems, particularly with respect to the moderniza-
tion and amplification of the law.lo
Thus, the law schools may help us escape from the first impasse
in the administration of justice caused by the Jacksonian Revolution,
which resulted in immersing judges in politics by reason of their
selection by popular election and in the hamstringing of the trial
judge, as well as from the second impasse in justice, caused by their
concentration on the study of the substantive law of our business
civilization. It could be a triumph for legal education, second not
even to the success of the case system of law study. The remedies
105. Cf. REDLIc, op. cit. supra note 44.
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are simple; they have been clearly demonstrated. The underlying
issue in legal education clearly is, will the law schools respond to
the challenge and assume their proper leadership in improving -the
administration of civil and criminal justice?
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